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THE VALUE IN SECRECY
Camilla A. Hrdy*
Trade secret law is seen as the most inclusive of intellectual property
regimes. So long as information can be kept secret, the wisdom goes, it can
be protected under trade secret law, even if patent and copyright protections
are unavailable. But keeping it a secret does not magically transform
information into a trade secret. The information must also derive economic
value from being kept secret from others. This elusive statutory
requirement—called “independent economic value”—might at first glance
seem redundant, especially in the context of litigation. After all, if
information had no value, why would the plaintiff have bothered to keep it
secret, and why would the parties be arguing over the right to use or disclose
it? Surely, well-kept secrets that end up in court must be valuable.
That assumption is pervasive. But it is wrong. Secrecy does not
demonstrate value. Even a company’s best-kept secrets might be
commercially worthless if vetted against what is known in the rest of the
industry. Nor does the decision to pursue litigation indicate value. Trade
secret litigants have plenty of exogenous reasons for pursuing lawsuits that
have little to do with information’s inherent value. Most importantly,
“value” is not the statutory standard; the standard is economic value that
comes specifically from secrecy.
Some federal courts have begun to call out weak assertions of independent
economic value and, in the process, are redefining the role of this neglected
statutory requirement. By analyzing this case law and drawing on insights
from the larger field of intellectual property law, this Article generates a

* Professor of Intellectual Property Law, University of Akron School of Law; Affiliated
Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School; Visiting Scholar, Engelberg Center on
Innovation Law & Policy, NYU School of Law. Thanks to Victoria Cundiff, Sharon Sandeen,
Deepa Varadarajan, Tait Graves, Barton Beebe, Dan Brean, Michael Burstein, Chris
Buccafusco, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Mike Gentithes, Deborah Gerhardt, Julia Haines, George
Horvath, Jeanne Fromer, Julia Knight, Sonia Katyal, Vera Korzun, Mark Lemley, Dave
Levine, Yvette Joy Liebesman, Orly Lobel, Ngozi Okidegbe, Michael Pollack, Stefan
Padfield, Michael Risch, Elizabeth Rowe, Jason Schultz, Mike Schuster, Stewart Sterk, and
Katherine Strandburg. Thanks also to those who provided comments at the Virtual Trade
Secrets Workshop held on July 17, 2020, the 18th Annual Works-in-Progress Intellectual
Property Colloquium at the Texas A&M University School of Law held virtually on February
13, 2021, the University of Akron School of Law’s Faculty Research and Development
(FReD) Workshop held virtually on May 20, 2021, the Corporate Innovation & Legal Policy
Colloquium at the University of San Diego School of Law held on October 13, 2021, and the
Information Society Project Ideas Lunch held virtually at Yale Law School on January 20,
2022.

557

558

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

typology of “value failures” that can arise in any given trade secret dispute—
amount failures, causation failures, type failures, and timing failures. Courts
in trade secret cases should screen for value failures far more consistently
than they currently do. Otherwise, courts risk giving trade secret status to
mere confidential information. This leads to wasted court resources and has
detrimental consequences for competition, innovation, speech, and employee
mobility.
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INTRODUCTION
The conventional wisdom is that the primary requirement for owning a
trade secret is secrecy. To some degree, this is true. Whether the information
is a formula for a soft drink or a list of customers in need of frequent roof
repairs, the primary step that would-be trade secret owners must take is to
keep the information secret. They must ensure that it does not become widely
known in the industry, and they must use “reasonable” secrecy precautions,
such as locks, digital security, and nondisclosure agreements.1 However,
secrecy is not the be-all and end-all. To be a legally enforceable trade secret,
the information must also possess a certain degree of economic value
attributable to the fact that it is being kept secret from others.
This legal requirement is hardly a secret. It is contained in the plain
language of the state and federal trade secret statutes, which provide that the
claimed information must derive “independent economic value, actual or
potential,” from not being known to others who could themselves obtain
economic value from the information.2 The requirement was also prominent
in the common law, where, among other things, a trade secret had to give the
holder “an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it.”3 The law of trade secrecy has never protected mere secrets;
it has always limited protection to secrets that confer some degree of
economic advantage over others.
At a conceptual level, “independent economic value” performs an essential
line-drawing function in trade secret law. It distinguishes mere secrets,
which abound in human society, from trade secrets, which are treated as a
form of intellectual property.4 And yet, historically, courts sitting in trade
1. See Camilla A. Hrdy & Sharon K. Sandeen, The Trade Secrecy Standard for Patent
Prior Art, 70 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1287–91 (2021).
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); see also Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No.
114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 636–37 (2021); see also, e.g., Deepa
Varadarajan, The Trade Secret-Contract Interface, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1543, 1551 (2018);
Joseph P. Fishman & Deepa Varadarajan, Similar Secrets, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1063
(2019).
3. As explained herein, the common law concept of “competitive advantage” is the
precursor for today’s requirement of “independent economic value.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1939); see also infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
4. See also Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 311 (2008). But see Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade
Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 241 (1998). See
generally Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (assessing trade secrets as
innovation incentives and as potential alternatives to patents).
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secret litigation have not closely scrutinized plaintiffs’ assertions of
independent economic value.5 Many courts recite the statutory language but
do not assess value in any depth, focusing instead on the other statutory
requirements—in particular, whether the plaintiff took reasonable measures
to keep the information secret.6 Independent economic value, if it appears at
all, is an afterthought, something that courts assume can be shown easily
from circumstantial evidence, such as the time, money, and effort invested in
developing the information.7 There is also a surprising paucity of law review
articles on the subject, with only a few delving specifically into this particular
doctrinal component of the law.8
It is not difficult to see why this is the case. Courts and commentators
assume, not irrationally, that any information that ends up in court as the
plausible subject of trade secret litigation has at least potential economic
value sufficient to satisfy the statute. Why else would the plaintiff have
bothered to take secrecy precautions?9 Why else would the plaintiff be going
to court to defend the secret?10 Also, why else would the parties be arguing
over the right to use or disclose it? Surely the information has potential value
to someone. As one trade secret expert astutely observes, the common
reasoning goes: “[A]fter all, if the information did not have value to the party
now seeking the court’s aid in protecting it, that party would not be in court
and if it did not have value to the party accused of misappropriating it the
alleged misappropriation would not have occurred.”11
5. See 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.07A
(Matthew Bender & Co. 2020) (1967); ELIZABETH A. ROWE & SHARON K. SANDEEN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TRADE SECRET LAW 146 (3d ed. 2021); Eric E. Johnson, Trade Secret
Subject Matter, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 545, 557 (2010); Michael Risch, Trade Secret Law and
Information Development Incentives, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 152, 166–67 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J.
Strandburg eds., 2011); Camilla A. Hrdy & Mark A. Lemley, Abandoning Trade Secrets, 73
STAN. L. REV. 1, 31–41 (2021).
6. See infra notes 195–202 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 121–25 and accompanying text.
8. But see Johnson, supra note 5, at 556–57, 567–73 (positing economic value as a
particularly important component of trade secret subject matter); Eric R. Claeys, The Use
Requirement at Common Law and Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV.
583, 587, 613–14 (2010) (discussing economic value as a replacement for the common law’s
use requirement); Hrdy & Lemley, supra note 5, at 31–41 (arguing that economic value plays
a crucial role in setting the expiration date for a trade secret); see also Sharon K. Sandeen, The
Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 524–26 (2010) (discussing the drafting
history of economic value); Charles Tait Graves & Sonia K. Katyal, From Trade Secrecy to
Seclusion, 109 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1407 (2021) (suggesting that “revisiting” economic value
provides one way to address overreliance on trade secrecy in nontraditional contexts).
9. See Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Precautions, Possession, and Notice, 68
HASTINGS L.J. 357, 375 (2017) (explaining the view that “plaintiff’s secrecy precautions are
circumstantial evidence of . . . the information’s independent economic value”).
10. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 697–98 (1980) (“[T]he plaintiff apparently thinks the secret has value,
for he is willing to invest in the litigation.”).
11. Victoria A. Cundiff, A Trade Secrets Crash Course 2019: What to Learn from
Disputes over Driverless Cars, Data Analytics, and More (July 5, 2019), in TRADE SECRETS
2019: WHAT EVERY LAWYER SHOULD KNOW 35, 73 (Victoria A. Cundiff ed., 2019) (noting
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This assumption is pervasive, but wrong. Independent economic value
cannot be presumed from the mere fact that the plaintiff kept information
secret, or from the mere fact that the plaintiff is suing to stop another from
using or disclosing the information. Trade secret plaintiffs have plenty of
exogenous reasons for pursuing litigation that have little to do with
information’s inherent value. Possible motivations include strategically
harassing potential competitors, threatening litigation to deter a star
employee from leaving, or acting on a desire to prevent the leakage of
embarrassing facts.12 Although there are some external limits on trade
secrecy’s ability to shield information that the public needs to know—such
as a new federal whistleblower provision13 and a sliver of First Amendment
protection that can be triggered when trade secret laws prohibit disclosure of
information of high public interest14—independent economic value is the
only internal limit on protection for information that does not have the right
amount or the right kind of value. It tells us that some of this information is
just not a trade secret at all. Moreover, independent economic value applies
in every case, not just in cases that interest the public at large. “Value
failures,” as this Article calls them, can arise in disputes over all sorts of
confidential information. The universe of secrets affected is vast, and the
policy considerations are diverse.
In recent years, some federal courts have grown skeptical of the type and
quality of information asserted to be trade secrets and have begun to
reference independent economic value as a limiting principle.15 These
decisions have challenged the status of information previously assumed to be
standard trade secrets, ranging from a political campaign’s donor lists, to
salary and office revenue data, to documents outlining internal company
procedures, to software code.16 The upshot of these opinions is that secrecy
critically that “[t]he UTSA and DTSA’s requirement that information claimed to be a trade
secret must have independent economic value (actual or potential) is often overlooked”).
12. Graves & Katyal, supra note 8, at 1341 (suggesting that companies utilize the strategy
of “labeling sensitive or embarrassing information as a ‘trade secret’ or ‘confidential’ [in order
to] stall or silence calls for disclosure”).
13. The new federal whistleblower provision creates immunity from liability under state
or federal law for those who disclose “a trade secret . . . solely for the purpose of reporting or
investigating a suspected violation of law . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1833; see also Peter S. Menell,
Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret Protection, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1–7
(2017) (advocating for a safe harbor provision to protect those who disclose potential trade
secrets in order to report illegal activity).
14. See Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and
the First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777 (2006); Pamela Samuelson, First Amendment
Defenses in Trade Secrecy Cases, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK
OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 269, 269.
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(holding political campaign’s donor lists and fundraising strategies lacked independent
economic value); Danaher Corp. v. Gardner Denver, Inc., No. 19-CV-1794, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89674, at *45 (E.D. Wis. May 20, 2020) (holding template for leading internal
meetings lacked independent economic value); Providence Title Co. v. Truly Title Inc., 547
F. Supp. 3d 585, 610–11 (E.D. Tex. 2021) (holding employee salary and office revenue data
lacked independent economic value); see also Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Sys. Corp., 66
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is not enough; plaintiffs also need to make a plausible case for why their
information derives economic value from secrecy. As one court put it:
Just because a business benefits from keeping certain information
confidential, does not necessarily mean that the information has
independent economic value derived from its confidentiality. Otherwise,
all confidential business information would constitute a trade secret and the
additional statutory requirement that the information have independent
economic value would be rendered meaningless. 17

By analyzing this case law and by drawing on insights from the broader
field of intellectual property, this Article generates a typology of “value
failures”—scenarios in which information asserted in trade secret litigation
fails to derive independent economic value and in which courts may
accordingly dismiss the claim, or deny the requested relief, due to failure to
satisfy this criterion.18 Value failures operate along multiple dimensions.
The first is the “amount failure.” This occurs when the information simply
fails to meet a minimum quantitative threshold of actual or even potential
value. Trade secret law, similar to patent and copyright law, adopts a
hands-off approach that leaves the ultimate assessment of information’s
value to private markets. However, a low standard is not the same as no
standard. If information’s value is too minimal to be legally cognizable, then
there is no trade secret.19
The second, far more subtle value failure is the “causation failure.” This
occurs when information’s asserted value is not actually caused by the fact
that it is being kept secret. A lot of information is valuable in a certain sense.
Perhaps the holder invested significant time and money in development;
perhaps employees rely on the information in day-to-day operations. But
“value” is not the same as value that comes “independent[ly]” from secrecy,
which is what the statute expressly requires.20 If information’s only plausible
value comes from what is already well known in the industry, then this is not
a trade secret. For example, if the putative trade secret is the design of a
product that is alleged to be valuable because it is superior to others on the
market, the secret aspects of the design, not the generally known aspects,
must be responsible for that superiority. If properly applied, this causation
component raises the bar on what can be protected and simultaneously
reinforces the secrecy requirement itself. Secrecy ensures that the law does

Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 18–20 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding software code whose functionality stemmed
mostly from open-source public elements lacked independent economic value).
17. Providence Title Co., 547 F. Supp. 3d at 610–11; see also, e.g., Elsevier Inc. v. Dr.
Evidence, LLC, No. 17-cv-5540, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10730, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23,
2018) (“[C]onfidential information is not the same as a trade secret.”).
18. As discussed herein, most trade secret rulings are issued very early in the case, often
on a motion to dismiss or motion for preliminary injunction. Sometimes, it is appropriate for
courts to give plaintiffs leave to amend in order to clarify how information derives independent
economic value. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part IV.A.
20. This Article’s interpretation of the statutory term “independent” is discussed in
Part I.B.4.
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not protect what is already known and free to use.21 The value-from-secrecy
mandate ensures that the law does not protect holistic “value” that comes
only from what is widely known. If there is no value in secrecy to protect,
then there is no right under trade secret law to prevent disclosure or use by
others.22
The third value failure is the “type failure.” Here, the information has the
wrong type of value. Unlike patent and copyright law, which do not require
inventions or works of authorship to have commercial merit,23 trade secret
law specifically requires economic value. While the term sweeps broadly,
recognizing countless ways to capture the value of information, the asserted
value must at least be connected to the business or to some form of
wealth-seeking activity.24 The putative economic value cannot stem purely
from the fact that the secret-holder would prefer that the information be kept
confidential or from the fact that disclosure would harm their reputation; the
information must be plausibly connected to some underlying economic
activity.25
The final value failure is the “timing failure.” This occurs when the
putative trade secret is asserted during the incorrect time frame. Other
intellectual property rights come with fixed statutory terms26 or require “use
in commerce” to tether their term lengths to ongoing commercial activity.27
Trade secret law today has neither of these. Instead, it relies on independent
economic value to set the time frame for protection. When properly applied,
independent economic value ensures that trade secrets are transitory rights,
protectable only during a certain window of time. Information cannot be
protected too early, before it possesses even potential economic value, or too
late, after the information has become so outdated that it is no longer
conceivably valuable to anyone.28 Either of these situations results in a
timing failure.
The most important message here is that secrets can end up in court even
if they do not have independent economic value. Courts must assess this
legal requirement in every case in a meaningful way, screening for all four
21. See Lemley, supra note 4, at 343 (arguing that requirement of “[s]ecrecy is critical to
ensuring that trade secret law does not interfere with robust competition or with the
dissemination of new ideas”).
22. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984) (applying common law
and stating that it is the “competitive advantage over others” that the holder of the secret
“enjoys by virtue of its exclusive access” that the law protects against disclosure or use by
others that “would destroy that competitive edge”).
23. See, e.g., Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1204.
24. This concept does not literally require “for profit” activity. Entities deemed nonprofits
for tax purposes can still own trade secrets. They can own trademarks, too. See Leah Chan
Grinvald, Charitable Trademarks, 50 AKRON L. REV. 817, 829 (2016); see also infra note 274
and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 275–84 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (setting patent term at twenty years); 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a) (setting copyright term at life of author plus seventy years for single-author works).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (delineating “use in commerce” requirement and establishing rule
for “abandonment” due to discontinuance of use).
28. See Hrdy & Lemley, supra note 5, at 1.
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kinds of value failures. Otherwise, courts will inevitably protect secrets that
are not meant to be protected under trade secret law, leading to a variety of
negative and unintended consequences, including wasted court resources,
needless restrictions on access to information, and unjustified barriers to
employee mobility, competition, and innovation.
Trade secret law is at an important crossroads. For the first time, civil
plaintiffs can now bring both federal claims under the Defend Trade Secrets
Act of 201629 (DTSA) and state law claims under their jurisdiction’s version
of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act30 (UTSA).31 At the same time,
developments in patent law have cast doubt on the viability of patents in
protecting certain types of inventions and led to enhanced mechanisms for
weeding out invalid patents.32 Consequently, companies are likely to turn
more often to trade secret law.33 Given the new importance of trade secret
law on the federal stage and within the field of intellectual property law, this
is a crucial time to get the law right. More courts should take this opportunity
to reevaluate assumptions about what can and cannot be a trade secret under
the law.
Defendants are not the only ones who would benefit from courts paying
more attention to independent economic value. Companies that possess truly
valuable trade secrets that give them an economic advantage in the
marketplace should also support such a turn. Since the movement toward
federalization that culminated in the enactment of the DTSA, there have been
critiques of trade secrets from all sides: Trade secrets should be protected
under state law, not federal law.34 Trade secrets are bad for employees.35
Trade secrets stand in the way of the disclosure of information of high public
interest.36 Trade secrets are contributing to a “black box” society in which
29. Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
30. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 628–830 (2021).
31. Note that New York has not adopted the UTSA; it still uses the common law. See infra
notes 42, 60, 103 and accompanying text.
32. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation
Incentives, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1115, 1117 (2015); see also Megan M. La Belle, Public
Enforcement of Patent Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1869 (2016).
33. See, e.g., JEFFREY MORDAUNT, NEIL EISGRUBER & JOSHUA SWEDLOW, STOUT, TRENDS
IN TRADE SECRET LITIGATION REPORT 2020, at 16 (2020), https://www.winston.com/images/
content/2/0/v2/203824/trends-in-trade-secret-litigation-report-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
8YTY-Q7RX].
34. See Letter from Eric Goldman et al., Professors, to Charles E. Grassley, Robert
W. Goodlatte, Patrick J. Leahy & John Conyers, Jr., Sens. (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2090&context=historical
[https://perma.cc/VDY2-SZKG].
35. See ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE
LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 7–8 (2013) [hereinafter LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE];
Orly Lobel, The DTSA and the New Secrecy Ecology, 1 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L.
REV. 369, 376–81 (2017).
36. See David S. Levine, The Impact of Trade Secrecy on Public Transparency, in THE
LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, supra
note 5, at 406, 431–32 (critiquing trade secret exemption that prevents government from
releasing information of public interest); Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets:
Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1356–57 (2018)
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commerce and discourse are controlled by algorithms whose functions are
opaque.37 If trade secret plaintiffs brought higher quality claims, at least
some of these critiques might subside. Taking independent economic value
more seriously is a first step toward taking trade secrets more seriously.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays the groundwork by
introducing the major concepts and statutory terms underlying independent
economic value. Part II exposes and critiques the prevailing assumptions that
seem to justify courts’ behavior in ignoring or downplaying the requirement.
Part III reveals that at least some courts, particularly during the DTSA’s first
five years, have found that independent economic value is not satisfied in
certain circumstances, casting doubt on the notion that the requirement is
redundant and revealing a possible future in which value plays a greater role
in litigation than it currently does. Part IV draws on these case law findings
and insights from across the intellectual property field to develop a typology
of value failures, which should help courts screen cases for value issues and
more effectively assess them when they arise.
This Article concludes by urging courts to assess the statutory requirement
of independent economic value more consistently, like they do with secrecy
and reasonable secrecy precautions. Courts and commentators are wrong to
ignore or trivialize this requirement.
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF INDEPENDENT ECONOMIC VALUE
The statutory requirement of independent economic value is a vestige of
the common law concept of competitive advantage. This part therefore
begins with an analysis of the common law and then moves to a detailed
statutory interpretation of independent economic value as codified in federal
and state law today.
A. The Common Law Concept of Competitive Advantage
Trade secret law was originally designed to remedy the consequences of
breaches of trust by employees, to safeguard firms’ investments in valuable
secrets, and to prevent unfair or immoral acts of competition in the

(discussing implications of trade secret privilege in the criminal justice system); Robin
Feldman & Charles Tait Graves, Naked Price and Pharmaceutical Trade Secret Overreach,
22 YALE J.L. & TECH. 61, 63–64 (2020) (discussing trade secrets covering drug pricing
information); Deepa Varadarajan, Business Secrecy Expansion and FOIA, 68 UCLA L. REV.
462, 462 (2021) (discussing recent expansion of the Freedom of Information Act exemption
for trade secrets or “confidential information”); Christopher J. Morten & Amy Kapczynski,
The Big Data Regulator, Rebooted: Why and How the FDA Can and Should Disclose
Confidential Data on Prescription Drugs and Vaccines, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 493, 493 (2021)
(critiquing trade secrecy’s interference with disclosure of information related to the safety and
efficacy of drugs and vaccines); Amy Kapczynski, The Public History of Trade Secrets,
55 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1367, 1382–1413 (2022) (using history to critique current approach to
trade secrets as triggering a government taking of property).
37. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 2, 14–15 (2015); Sonia K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source
Code Secrecy, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1183, 1186–87 (2019).
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marketplace.38 Until the drafting in 1979 of a uniform act that states
gradually adopted in the 1980s, trade secret law was exclusively based in
common law39 and was generally lumped within a larger body of law called
unfair competition.40
The concept of “competitive advantage” was central to trade secrecy under
the common law. Several sources indicate that, to be protected under the
common law, a trade secret had to confer on its owner a competitive
advantage over others who did not know the information. The Restatement
(First) of Torts (“First Restatement”), drafted in 1939 and generally seen as
reflecting the state of the common law at that time, defined a trade secret as
“any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in
one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it.”41 The First Restatement also
instructed courts to consider, as one of six factors, “the value of the
information to the plaintiff’s business and to its competitors.”42 The
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (“Third Restatement”), which
was drafted in 1995 to restate the common law, defined a trade secret as “any
information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise
and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential
economic advantage over others.”43 Last but hardly least, the U.S. Supreme
Court itself, in the course of assessing the common law to determine whether
trade secrets are “property” under the Takings Clause, once described “[t]he
economic value” of a trade secret as “the competitive advantage over others”
that it imparts to its owner.44
While commentators tend to discuss only the “used in one’s business”
component of the common law,45 the competitive advantage requirement was
38. See AMÉDÉE E. TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 3–4 (1962); see also ROWE &
SANDEEN, supra note 5, at 21–28; Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a
Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 834–43 (2017);
Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of “Commercial Morality” in Trade Secret Doctrine, 96 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 125, 125 (2020).
39. See, e.g., Michael Risch, An Empirical Look at Trade Secret Law’s Shift from
Common to Statutory Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 151
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
40. See, e.g., HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 1,
at 1–2, §§ 141–143, at 294–98 (2d ed. 1921); JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF
TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 90–93, at 208–17 (3d ed. 1917);
3 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS &
MONOPOLIES § 14 (4th ed. 2020); see also Bone, supra note 4, at 251–61; Lemley, supra note
4, at 312–22; Hrdy & Lemley, supra note 5, at 16–17.
41. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1939) (emphasis added).
42. Id. New York courts continue to use the common law and the First Restatement. See
Telerete Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Even a slight competitive
edge will satisfy this requirement of trade secret protection.”); see also, e.g., Sheridan v.
Mallinckrodt, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1347, 1352 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. L. INST. 1995) (emphasis
added).
44. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984) (emphasis added); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
45. See, e.g., Claeys, supra note 8, at 588.
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arguably far more important. It could arise in virtually every case, regardless
of whether the trade secret was being used or not.46 And, unlike the “used in
one’s business” requirement, it is still incorporated into the law today via the
statutory requirement of independent economic value.47 Thus, it is essential
to understand this nuanced and somewhat elusive concept.
In economics, a firm has a competitive advantage if it can earn a higher
rate of profit than other firms in the market.48 Firms can achieve a
competitive advantage through a variety of means, such as by lowering costs
compared to rivals, by hiring the best talent, or by adopting aggressive
marketing campaigns.49 One of the main ways to gain a competitive
advantage is to invest in research and development that results in an
“innovation”—i.e., something that one’s competitors do not have.50 Indeed,
investing in innovation may be the most effective way to gain a competitive
advantage over rivals,51 at least until the rivals catch up. This is where trade
secret law comes in.
From a firm’s perspective, trade secrets are legal tools used to preserve
competitive advantages that would otherwise dissipate due to espionage,
subversive employees, or the passage of time.52 Firms may elect to protect
some inventions through patents, willingly risking public disclosure in
exchange for a twenty-year-long exclusive right.53 But firms often choose
protection through trade secrecy instead, usually supplemented by a thicket
of contractual protections like nondisclosure agreements.54 They choose
46. In fact, courts sometimes interpreted the use requirement loosely, protecting research
and know-how when it was related to use, was the result of significant expenditures, and
imparted an advantage over others. See TURNER, supra note 38, at 32–37, 111–12.
47. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. For example, the Third Restatement, which
was also intended to reflect the modern statutory regime that many states had adopted by 1995,
addressed the “[r]equirement of value” and equated value with competitive advantage, stating
in relevant part that “[a] trade secret must be of sufficient value in the operation of a business
or other enterprise to provide an actual or potential economic advantage over others who do
not possess the information.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmts. b, e
(AM. L. INST. 1995).
48. See DAVID BESANKO, DAVID DRANOVE, MARK SHANLEY & SCOTT SCHAEFER,
ECONOMICS OF STRATEGY 295–99 (6th ed. 2013); MICHAEL PORTER, COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 3 (1985).
49. PORTER, supra note 48, at 11–12; BESANKO ET AL., supra note 48, at 308–10; see also
Glenn Purdue, Understanding the Economic Value of Trade Secrets, AM. BAR ASS’N (Mar.
28, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/intellectual-property/
articles/2014/understanding-economic-value-trade-secrets/ [https://perma.cc/XAN8-CPBT].
50. CHRISTINE GREENHALGH & MARK ROGERS, INNOVATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 4 (2010).
51. See PORTER, supra note 48, at 20; see also ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF
INNOVATION 5 (1988).
52. See JAMES POOLEY, SECRETS: MANAGING INFORMATION ASSETS IN THE AGE OF
CYBERESPIONAGE 1–36, 59–75 (2015); see also WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 354–71 (2003).
53. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–112, 154; see also Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 539, 545 (2009).
54. Contracts serve both as an alternative means of protection and as a way to shore up
firms’ legal argument that they took “reasonable” measures to protect their secrets. See
Varadarajan, supra note 2, at 1543. A contract claim may persist even if trade secrecy fails.
See Orly Lobel, Enforceability TBD: From Status to Contract in Intellectual Property Law,
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trade secrecy for strategic reasons, not wanting to publicly disclose in patents
subject matter that is easy to keep secret, or because the information in
question is not patentable.55 A lot of information falls into both categories
when the information is neither self-disclosing nor patentable, and is also the
type of information that is necessarily exposed to the firm’s own
employees.56 By many accounts, one of the main reasons for which trade
secret law arose was to help employers protect hard-won competitive
advantages against their own employees, who might otherwise be tempted to
leave with their former employers’ best secrets.57 For all these reasons, it
should not be surprising that the common law—and now the modern
statutory regime—use competitive advantage as the touchstone for trade
secret protectability.58 The need to help companies retain competitive
advantages is a big part of why certain information is legally protected as a
trade secret in the first place.
B. Statutory Independent Economic Value Under the UTSA and DTSA
We move now to the modern statutory text. In 1979, the American Bar
Association approved the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Drafted by the
Uniform Law Commission, also known as the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the UTSA is a uniform act that was
intended to effectuate codification of the common law.59 The UTSA was
eventually adopted by virtually every state except for New York.60 Decades
later, in 2016, Congress passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act to provide a
new federal civil cause of action that supplements a preexisting criminal
cause of action and expressly modeled the text of the federal law on the

96 B.U. L. REV. 869, 890 (2016); see also Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information
Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 227 (2012).
55. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974); see also Katherine
J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?: Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004
WIS. L. REV. 81, 104–18 (discussing disclosing versus self-disclosing inventions); see also,
e.g., David Teece, The Strategic Management of Technology and Intellectual Property, in
COMPETING THROUGH INNOVATION: TECHNOLOGY STRATEGY AND ANTITRUST POLICIES 3,
13–14 (David Teece ed., 2013); R. MARK HALLIGAN & RICHARD F. WEYAND, TRADE SECRET
ASSET MANAGEMENT 2018: A GUIDE TO INFORMATION ASSET MANAGEMENT INCLUDING RICO
AND BLOCKCHAIN 2–16 (2018).
56. See POOLEY, supra note 52, at 29–36.
57. See id. at 17–18; see also Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets,
Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–
1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 450–60 (2011).
58. 1 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 5, § 1.07A (describing competitive advantage as the
“touchstone” for modern independent economic value).
59. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 636–37 (2021); see also
Bone, supra note 4, at 247; Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 38, at 841–42.
60. New York still uses the common law, which includes the “use” requirement. See, e.g.,
Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Sci. Commc’n, Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 968 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1939)).
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UTSA.61 While there are some specific differences,62 the UTSA’s and
DTSA’s definitions of “trade secret” are nearly identical.63 The DTSA did
not preempt the UTSA, meaning plaintiffs can now bring both federal and
state law claims.64
The modern statutes explicitly eliminated the common law’s “used in
one’s business” requirement. The primary reasons for this included the
concern that early-stage research and prototypes would not qualify for
protection if trade secrecy required actual use in a business,65 as well as the
emerging belief that trade secret law should fill the “economic holes” left by
patent law by helping inventors protect their inventions in the vulnerable
precommercial stages.66 Trade secrecy was also increasingly seen as a legal
mechanism that would generally facilitate efficient sharing of information
and reduce wasteful expenditures on self-help measures.67
However, while actual use is no longer required, the law still demands that
a trade secret derive independent economic value from not being generally
known to others “who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use
of the information.”68 Commentators sometimes use the terms “value” or
“economic value” as shorthand for independent economic value,69 but the
requirement is extremely specific. Each of the defining statutory terms—
“economic,” “potential,” “other persons” or “another person,” and
“independent”—is infused with meaning. The following sections interpret

61. See David S. Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical
Study of the First Year of Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 105, 114, 119 (2018); see also Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294,
110 Stat. 3488 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
62. There are some differences with respect to misappropriation, damages, and
injunctions limiting employment. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836(b)(3), 1839(5)–(6).
63. H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 5 (2016) (“The Act’s definition of misappropriation is
modeled on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 10 (2016). Courts
have determined that the definitions are virtually identical. See, e.g., Brand Energy &
Infrastructure Servs., Inc. v. Irex Contracting Grp., No. CV-16-2499, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43497, at *8–9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2017); Deerpoint Grp., Inc. v. Agrigenix, LLC, 345 F. Supp.
3d 1207, 1227 (E.D. Cal. 2018); Bombardier Inc. v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Corp., 383 F. Supp.
3d 1169, 1178 (W.D. Wash. 2019).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (declining to preempt state remedies for misappropriation of a trade
secret).
65. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 637 (2021) (“The
broader definition in the proposed Act extends protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an
opportunity or acquired the means to put a trade secret to use.”); see also Hrdy & Lemley,
supra note 5, at 21–22, 24–25, 30–31.
66. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 52, at 359; see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
prefatory note (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 629 (2021) (“In view of the substantial number of
patents that are invalidated by the courts, many businesses now elect to protect commercially
valuable information through reliance upon the state law of trade secret protection.”).
67. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485–86, 493 (1974); see also Lemley,
supra note 4, at 311, 338–39.
68. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 636–37. The DTSA is identical, except it
uses the singular “another person” instead of “other persons.” 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); see
infra note 96.
69. See, e.g., Sun Media Sys. Inc. v. KDSM, LLC, 564 F. Supp. 2d 946, 969–70
(S.D. Iowa 2008).
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statutory text, relying on various tools of construction like dictionaries,70
legislative history,71 restatements, and a major treatise.72 They also
incorporate responses from an interview with a drafter of the UTSA.73
1. Economic
The First Restatement defined the universe of trade secrets narrowly,
indicating that a “trade secret” would generally be a “process or device for
continuous use in the operation of the business” and would “generally . . .
relat[e] to the production of goods, as, for example, a machine or formula for
the production of an article.”74 In contrast, the modern UTSA and DTSA
regimes expand the universe of trade secrets to “information” writ large and
do not contain limiting requirements like use in business or relation to the
production of goods.75 They also use the extremely broad term “economic”
in defining the type of value that matters.
The UTSA drafters initially proposed the term “commercial” to modify
value, but they rejected “commercial” in favor of the modifier “economic.”
There has been some debate over the significance of this choice,76 but a
variety of evidence suggests that the drafters perceived the terms “economic”
and “commercial” value to be virtually identical in substance. The drafters
of both the UTSA and the DTSA continued to use the term “commercial”
value alongside the text’s reference to “economic” value.77 The dictionary
definitions are similar in spirit, referencing analogous concepts such as trade,
industry, wealth creation, and profitability.78 But instead, the UTSA’s
70. Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 38, at 865–84 (discussing various sources of
interpretation for the DTSA).
71. H.R. REP. NO. 114-529 (2016); S. REP. NO. 114-220 (2016); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS
ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 637–38 (2021); see also Sandeen & Seaman, supra
note 38, at 865–84 (discussing various sources of interpretation for the DTSA, including the
UTSA and its accompanying commentary).
72. 1 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 5, § 1.07A.
73. I interviewed Richard Dole about the meaning of these terms. See generally Interview
with Richard Dole, Bobby Wayne Young Professor of Consumer L., Univ. of Hous. L. Ctr.
(Dec. 14, 2020) (on file with author). Dole was a member of the Special Committee on
Uniform Trade Secrets Protection Act and was involved in drafting the UTSA. See Sandeen,
supra note 8, at 513. This Article uses this interview solely to get a sense of how the drafters
may have perceived the meaning of the terms in 1979, not as a definitive source of statutory
interpretation. See also id. at 512–13, 518.
74. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1939).
75. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 636–37; 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).
76. Compare Ramon A. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277,
289 (1980) (suggesting the choice of the word “economic” was important), with Sandeen,
supra note 8, at 525–26 (arguing “economic” is synonymous with “commercial”).
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. e, § 44 cmt. c (AM. L. INST.
1995); see also S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 1 (2016).
78. The Oxford Dictionary of English defines “economic” as “[r]elating to economics or
the economy,” relating to “trade, industry, and the creation of wealth,” “[j]ustified in terms of
profitability,” or “[r]equiring fewer resources or costing less money.” Economic, in OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 557, 557 (Angus Stevenson ed., 3d ed. 2010). The same dictionary
defines “commercial” in relevant part as “[c]oncerned with or engaged in commerce,”
“[m]aking or intended to make a profit,” or “having profit rather than artistic or other value as
a primary aim.” Commercial, in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH, supra, at 349, 349. On the
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drafters decided to eschew the term “commercial” in order to highlight the
fact that current use of the information in commercial operations is no longer
required, and that the asserted value can now include “potential” future value
as well as actual current value.79 In other words, the choice of “economic”
over “commercial” was intended to modify the timeline on which value is to
be measured, rather than the substance of the value.
Whether we call it “commercial” or “economic” value, it seems clear that
the UTSA and the DTSA recognize that there is an exceptionally broad range
of ways to capture the value of information. Economic value can be
generated in the traditional way by using information to improve a business’s
production of goods. Economic value can also come from early-stage
research and “negative know-how” (knowledge of what not to do),80 from
licensing information to others for use,81 and even from intentionally hiding
the information to avoid competing with a business’s other product lines.82
However, the concept of economic value is not without limit. Information
whose value lacks any relationship to economic activity—to wealth creation,
profit-seeking, industry, or trade—does not qualify as having economic
value. This principle does not deny trade secret protections to nonprofit
companies.83 Nonprofit entities have successfully protected their donor lists
as trade secrets, for example.84 Yet there are some scenarios in which the
value in question is simply not economic in nature. For instance, a secret
recipe for cookies that a person uses only at home in the kitchen, and for
which they have no commercial intentions, does not derive economic value
from secrecy.85 More broadly, as explained in Part IV, if the putative trade
secret consists of information with no connection to what a business actually
does, then this too would fail to derive value that is “economic” in nature.86
use of dictionary evidence to interpret the DTSA and UTSA, see Sandeen & Seaman, supra
note 38, at 863–64.
79. Dole expressed the view that the terms “economic value” and “commercial value” are
the same, except that “economic value” encompasses “potential commercial value.” See
Interview with Richard Dole, supra note 73.
80. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 637–38 (2021).
81. For a recent example of a case recognizing licensing value as a form of economic
value under the DTSA, see, for example, Zabit v. Brandometry, LLC, 540 F. Supp. 3d 412,
421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (finding that plaintiffs alleged facts supporting a plausible claim
that “the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential” because they
alleged that they can license the algorithm, “the DTSA covers potential value,” and “th[e]
license was valued at $540,000” (emphasis omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B))).
82. See supra note 81.
83. The Third Restatement, for example, states that “[a]lthough rights in trade secrets are
normally asserted by businesses and other commercial enterprises, nonprofit entities . . . can
also claim trade secret protection for economically valuable information such as lists of
prospective members or donors.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d
(AM. L. INST. 1995).
84. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 923 F. Supp.
1231, 1251 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“[N]onprofit entities such as . . . religious organizations can also
claim trade secret protection for economically valuable information such as lists of prospective
members or donors.” (alterations in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1995))).
85. See infra notes 274–76 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 283–85 and accompanying text.

572

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

2. Potential
One of the most legally significant features of the statutory text of the
UTSA and the DTSA is use of the word “potential.” Both the UTSA and the
DTSA provide that the economic value of a trade secret can be “actual or
potential.”87 Some commentators have suggested that this indicates that the
trade secret owner can protect practically anything.88 However, the modifier
“potential” does not necessarily make it easier to obtain and maintain a trade
secret in every situation.89 Rather, the commentary to the UTSA indicates
that its drafters utilized the modifier “potential” in order to clarify that, unlike
under the common law, trade secrets did not have to be used in a business,
and could thus consist of research, prototypes, and other information that was
not yet in regular use in a business.90 They intended to expand the timeline
for trade secret protection to earlier stages of development.
The UTSA commentary states that the UTSA’s definition of a trade secret
“extends protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or
acquired the means to put a trade secret to use.”91 This “includes information
that has commercial value from a negative viewpoint,” such as “the results
of lengthy and expensive research which proves that a certain process will
not work” and which “could be of great value to a competitor.”92
Along with this so-called negative know-how, another example of a trade
secret with “potential” economic value that was contemplated by the UTSA
drafters is a prototype for an invention that the inventor has not yet perfected
or acquired the means to put into use. The commentary suggests that these
sorts of early-stage inventions should be protected, even if the common law
would have excluded them due to its use-in-business requirement.93 A
prototype, though not yet in-use, has “potential” economic value that may
come to fruition in the future; information embodied in the prototype can be
protected as a trade secret before that value materializes, during the period in
which the inventor is trying, for instance, to obtain patent protection or
secretly share the prototype with potential buyers or investors.94 The fact
that the value has not yet been achieved is not fatal. Likewise, the fact that
the prototype may one day be disclosed to the public does not destroy the
possibility of trade secrecy protection early on, before that disclosure occurs.
Far from opening the door to granting trade secret protection in instances
of merely hypothetical value, the reference to “potential” value in fact
suggests that there is a window of time during which trade secret protection
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (emphasis added); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended
1985), 14 U.L.A. 636–37 (2021) (emphasis added).
88. See Risch, supra note 5, at 166–67; Claeys, supra note 8, at 599.
89. See Sandeen, supra note 8, at 524.
90. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 637–38.
91. Id., 14 U.L.A. 637.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., Leatt Corp. v. Innovative Safety Tech., LLC, No. 09-CV-01301, U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 37382, at *15–21 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2010) (holding prototype for neck brace
protectable as trade secret).
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can be granted—specifically, the window of time during which information
has actual or potential value due to its secrecy. The corollary to this is that
some information may fall outside of that time frame, either because it is far
too early for the information to have even potential value or because any
value the information once had has dissipated over time.95 These issues are
discussed further in Part IV.
3. Economic Value from Not Being Known to Other Persons
or Another Person
The statutory text of the UTSA and the DTSA incorporate the common
law concept of competitive advantage. The UTSA provides, in relevant part,
that information must derive economic value from not being known to “other
persons,” or, under the DTSA, to “another person,”96 who could “obtain
economic value from the [information’s] disclosure or use.”97
This text is unwieldy, but it seems clear that the drafters’ goal was to codify
the common law’s requirement that a trade secret had to give its owner an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over others who did not know it or use
it.98 The general rule in interpreting statutes is that they are assumed to
incorporate common law principles that were “well established” at the time
of drafting, except where a “statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”99
As discussed above, competitive advantage was well established at common
law. It was also explicitly referenced in the UTSA commentary, which
suggests in places that the drafters assumed that a trade secret would “confer
a competitive advantage.”100 Moreover, Congress also used the phrase
repeatedly throughout the DTSA’s legislative history. For instance, the
95. Cf. Hrdy & Lemley, supra note 5, at 43–48 (arguing that trade secrets can lose their
potential value over time and become unprotectable, or be abandoned by their former owner).
96. The DTSA might seem at first glance to have made the economic advantage standard
less strict by using a singular noun “another person” in lieu of the UTSA’s plural noun “other
persons.” Compare UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 637
(2021), with 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B). However, the change was intended to make the federal
definition of “secrecy” stricter and “in conformity” with the UTSA’s. It was not intended to
be “meaningfully different from the scope of that definition as understood by courts in States
that have adopted the UTSA.” See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 10 (2016). The Economic
Espionage Act of 1996 had used “the public” to refer to the audience from whom information
must be secret—this was viewed as a problematic reference point for defining secrecy. See
United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 267 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A problem with using the general
public as the reference group for identifying a trade secret is that many things unknown to the
public at large are well known to engineers, scientists, and others . . . .”). Notably, the UTSA
drafters themselves had considered using a singular term to describe for whom the information
must be unknown. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 637–38.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i), 14 U.L.A. 637; see also
Johnson, supra note 5, at 567–69.
98. Dole, when asked, “How does ‘independent economic value’ relate to ‘competitive
advantage?’” answered: “They are similar concepts.” See Interview with Dole, supra note 73.
99. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (quoting
Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)).
100. See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 637 (“Because a trade secret
need not be exclusive to confer a competitive advantage, different independent developers can
acquire rights in the same trade secret.”).
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Senate report states that trade secrets are “an integral part . . . of the
competitive advantage . . . of many U.S.-based companies” and refers to
trade secrets as “commercially valuable” information because they give
companies an edge in a competitive marketplace.101 A diverse range of
courts and commentators have concluded that “independent economic value”
was intended to carry forward the concept of competitive advantage or
similar concepts like business or economic advantage.102
Further evidence of the continuing relevance of the competitive advantage
concept comes from Massachusetts, which was the last state to adopt the
UTSA103—and only did so after the passage of the DTSA. The
Massachusetts legislature specifically replaced the phrase “independent
economic value” with the phrase “economic advantage.”104 This reflects the
common perception that “independent economic value” just means economic
advantage due to secrecy. The phrase “economic advantage” is arguably
more accurate than “competitive advantage,” because courts had long held
under the UTSA that the “other persons” to whom a trade secret must have
value need not be direct competitors.105 The concept of economic advantage
clarifies that information can have the requisite independent economic value
to a wider variety of actors than just current competitors, including potential
future competitors or others who might benefit from the disclosure or use of
the information. This caveat is especially important for early-stage
companies for whom there is no identifiable competitor in the market and to
whom information might have value.106
4. Independent
The term “independent” is the most ambiguous term in the trade secret
statutes. The UTSA and DTSA state, in relevant part, that the secret has to
derive “independent economic value” from not being known to others.107
101. See S. REP. NO. 114–220, at 1 (2016).
102. 1 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 5, § 1.07A; 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS
LAW § 3:35 (Thomson Reuters 2019); ROWE & SANDEEN, supra note 5, at 146; see also, e.g.,
Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 900 (Minn. 1983); Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 1986); Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 731, 736 (Ct. App. 1997); Calisi v. Unified Fin. Servs., LLC, 302 P.3d 628, 633 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2013); Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab., Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714, 743
n.26 (Ct. App. 2014).
103. New York still uses the common law and the First Restatement. 24 Seven, LLC v.
Martinez, No. 19-CV-7320, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15480, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2021).
104. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 42(4)(i) (2020) (defining trade secret, in part, as
“provid[ing] economic advantage, actual or potential, from not being generally known . . . .”
(emphasis added)); see also Act of Aug. 10, 2018, ch. 228, § 19, 2018 Mass. Acts 101.
105. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 637–38 (2021);
see also, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231,
1253 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Altavion, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 743. I also asked Dole: “Who are
the ‘other persons’ who could obtain value from the information?” He said: “Actual or
potential competitors.” See Interview with Richard Dole, supra note 73.
106. See Hrdy & Lemley, supra note 5, at 19–24.
107. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 637 (2021) (emphasis
added); 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B).
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The law does not define “independent” or explain what it means. It leaves
significant room for speculation and divergence in opinion.108
One view is that “independent” means that the information must be
valuable in its own right, rather than derive its value from other
information.109 So, for example, one court dismissed a claim seeking to
protect passwords as trade secrets, reasoning that the value of a password is
dependent on the information it protects.110 But this view sweeps too
broadly. Virtually all trade secrets are, to some degree, dependent on other
information or inputs in order to be considered valuable.111 It is unlikely that
this is the interpretation the drafters had in mind.
The better interpretation of “independent,” and the one this Article adopts,
is that the word emphasizes that a trade secret’s economic value must derive
precisely from the fact that it is secret.
Several courts112 and
commentators113 share this interpretation. To understand the importance of
this principle, consider a world in which the statutes did not clarify that value
must come from secrecy. If this were the case, trade secret law could protect
an infinite variety of competitive advantages, even if they have nothing to do
with secrecy at all. Perhaps a company has economies of scale that allow it
to operate at lower costs; perhaps it hires the best talent; perhaps the company
has more experience in the field than others. These are valuable competitive
advantages, but they are not afforded trade secret protection because their
value to the owner is not due to the secrecy of any specific piece of
information.114
108. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 570–73.
109. See, e.g., Providence Title Co. v. Truly Title Co., 547 F. Supp. 3d 585, 611 (E.D. Tex.
2021) (“[A] trade secret must have independent economic value” and plaintiff’s “salary and
revenue information is not independently valuable; rather, the information is valuable only to
the extent that it can be used successfully to aid in the solicitation of valuable [plaintiff]
employees.”).
110. See State Analysis, Inc. v. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n, 621 F. Supp. 2d 309, 321 (E.D. Va.
2009). But see Compass iTech, LLC v. eVestment All., LLC, No. 14-81241-CIV, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 195907, at *43–44 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2016) (holding that “usernames and
passwords” can potentially be trade secrets under Florida’s UTSA); see also Simmons
Hardware Co. v. Waibel, 47 N.W. 814, 816 (S.D. 1891) (granting injunction under common
law to protect secret code used to decipher contents of catalogues used by salesmen and noting
that “[t]he original catalogue was of itself of but trifling value, but with the private code or
system of plaintiff marked therein it was of great value”).
111. For example, the UTSA was expressly intended to cover negative know-how
(knowledge of what not to do), which is valuable only to the extent that it can be used to aid
in the successful creation of positive secrets about what does work. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS
ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 637 (2021).
112. See, e.g., Mangren Rsch. & Dev. Corp. v. Nat’l Chem. Co., 87 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir.
1996); see also DTM Rsch., LLC v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 2001).
113. Dole, for his part, stated that the purpose of the term “independent” is “to emphasize
that the value of the information should derive from its secrecy.” See Interview with Dole,
supra note 73; see also, e.g., ROWE & SANDEEN, supra note 5, at 146 (“[I]dentified information
must have demonstrable commercial value because it is a secret.”); POOLEY, supra note 52, at
29–30, 63 (discussing competitive advantage and value derived from secrecy).
114. As one commentator observes, a showing of competitive advantage does not by itself
establish independent economic value “because the competitive advantage may be due to
something other than the alleged secret, such as, for example, to the owner’s expertise in the
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One might argue that, on this reading, the addition of the word
“independent” is redundant because the statute already provides that
information’s asserted economic value must derive from the fact that it is not
generally known to others.115 However, this is not the case. By stating that
information must derive “independent” economic value from its secrecy, the
statute clarifies that the secret nature of the information, in particular, must
be what creates the value. If the asserted trade secret involves a combination
of public and nonpublic elements, as is often the case, the value at issue must
come from the secret elements, not the public or otherwise unprotectable
elements.116 One court illustrated this concept using the example of a design
for the wing of an airplane.117 Simply alleging that the airplane’s wing
design is valuable because it helps the airplane fly does not demonstrate that
the secret aspects of the wing design generate this value—let alone that the
secret aspects of the wing design give the holder an economic advantage over
others.118 “Airplanes need wings to fly,” the court wrote, “but that does not
mean that all wing designs have independent economic value.”119
Importantly, this value-from-secrecy component cuts both ways. It limits
protection for information whose economic value does not come specifically
from secrecy, yet it also grants protection for information whose economic
value does come from secrecy, even if it might not resemble a traditional
trade secret. For example, take the cases involving protectability of
passwords, discussed directly above. A password quite literally derives its
value from secrecy. A password’s entire economic value rests on being kept
secret, and if it were disclosed, it would lose that value. Passwords thus give
an economic advantage to their holder as a result of being kept secret, even
if they do not seem economically valuable in a traditional sense.120
This interpretation of “independent” is essential. Its importance will
become clearer in Part IV, where this Article defines “causation failure” as a
situation in which the asserted economic value does not come specifically
from secrecy.
II. CHALLENGING THE PREVAILING WISDOM ABOUT INDEPENDENT
ECONOMIC VALUE
The prevailing wisdom is that courts apply a low bar for assessing
independent economic value, and that independent economic value is
field.” See 1 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 5, § 1.07A; see also SI Handling Sys., Inc. v.
Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1267 (3d Cir. 1985) (Adams, J., concurring) (noting the complications
that arise when employees’ knowledge, skill, and experience are “inextricably related to the
information or process that constitutes an employer’s competitive advantage”).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 636–37.
116. See infra notes 259–62 and accompanying text.
117. See Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Sys. Corp., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 19 (Ct. App. 2007).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. One could try to argue that a password’s value is not sufficiently economic in nature.
However, this is too strict a reading of “economic.” Passwords, unlike information about
management or employees, are connected to the business, so long as what they are protecting
is connected to the business.
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generally “the subject of less litigation than the secrecy or reasonable efforts
requirements.”121 Moreover, even when courts do assess it, they tend to
“allow a secret’s economic value to be established through inference”122 and
“circumstantial evidence”—in particular, by evaluating “the amount of
resources invested by the plaintiff in the production of the information” and
“the precautions taken by the plaintiff to protect the secrecy of the
information.”123 There is some empirical evidence that reflects this
assumption. Research on both state and federal trade secret cases decided
before the DTSA was passed found that courts rarely addressed independent
economic value and addressed it much less frequently than the requirement
of taking reasonable secrecy precautions. In a 2009 study of trade secret
claims brought in federal courts between 1950 and 2008, David Almeling
and several coauthors found that “only a few courts addressed the value
element, and only a few of those courts held that the element was not
satisfied.”124 Two years later, the same group of authors found similarly low
numbers in a study of trade secret cases brought in state courts.125
It is not hard to discern why courts have given economic value short shrift.
The reason is that courts generally assume that any information that the
plaintiff has developed and successfully kept secret, and that thereafter ends
up as the subject of litigation, has at least potential economic value to the
plaintiff or to others.126
Economic value, in this sense, resembles other doctrines within the
intellectual property field that, at first blush, appear redundant, such as patent
law’s requirement of “utility.”127 One might think that there is no need for
the law to legally require that a patented invention be useful. After all, “a
truly useless invention should be worthless, so who would go through the
expense of patenting it?”128 And why else would the patentee ever be in a
121. 1 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 5, § 1.07A; see also ROWE & SANDEEN, supra note
5, at 146.
122. DAVID QUINTO & STUART SINGER, TRADE SECRETS: LAW AND PRACTICE 103 (2d ed.
2012).
123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 1995).
124. David S. Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapoznikow, Whitney E. McCollum
& Jill Weader, A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ.
L. REV. 291, 319 (2010).
125. David S. Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapoznikow, Whitney E. McCollum
& Jill Weader, A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L.
REV. 57, 92 (2010).
126. See Cundiff, supra note 11, at 73; see also Johnson, supra note 5, at 557 (noting that
commentators assume that any information that ends up in litigation has “considerable value”
(quoting ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 417 (2d ed.
2004))); QUINTO & SINGER, supra note 122, at 103 (noting that “if the secret were not valuable,
the plaintiff would not have expended substantial resources to develop it and would not have
undertaken extraordinary means to protect its secrecy”).
127. 35 U.S.C. § 101; ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 211 (5th ed. 2011).
128. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 127, at 211 (provocatively positing this question); see
also Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (writing that if an invention’s
utility is “very limited, it will follow, that it will be of little or no profit to the inventor; and if
it be trifling, it will sink into utter neglect”).
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position to enforce the patent against someone else in court?129 But utility,
it turns out, is not redundant. In certain situations, a legal mandate of utility
plays an important role in controlling patentability.130 These include
situations in which the patent applicant asserts a utility for the invention that
is not credible based on current science,131 that is vague and nonspecific,132
or that is purely hypothetical and not presently availing.133
In this respect, trade secret law’s independent economic value requirement
is similar to requirements like patent utility.134 Independent economic value
at first seems redundant. Just as no one would bother to patent a useless
invention, so too would no one bother to protect, let alone litigate, a valueless
trade secret. Yet closer scrutiny reveals this premise to be entirely unfounded
and based on a number of erroneous assumptions. The mere fact that a
company has taken steps to keep information secret and has hired lawyers to
enforce the secret in court does not prove that the information has any value
at all—let alone the sort of value required by the statutes. There are a variety
of premises at work that need to be identified and evaluated. As shown
below, none of these on its own provides a solid case for ignoring or
downplaying independent economic value.
A. Secrecy Does Not Necessarily Indicate Economic Value from Secrecy
The first wrong assumption is that secrecy, on its own, indicates that
information derives economic value from secrecy. Some commentators have
suggested that the fact that information is secret—not “generally known” or
“readily ascertainable through proper means” to others135—indicates that the

129. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit once put it, the fact that someone
else, the defendant, is allegedly using or selling the claimed invention, and the plaintiff wants
them to stop, serves as “proof of that device’s utility,” for “[p]eople rarely, if ever, appropriate
useless inventions.” Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
130. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 127, at 212–14 (discussing incredible utility
doctrine); id. at 231–32 (discussing utility’s role in controlling the timing for when a patent
can be obtained); id. at 256–59 (discussing utility’s impact on racing and patent scope).
131. See, e.g., In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (denying patent for methods
of generating energy using cold fusion due to both lack of utility and failure of enablement).
In these cases, utility can overlap with “enablement” under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Sean B. Seymore,
Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1083–84 (2014).
132. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that patent
application “must disclose a use which is not so vague as to be meaningless” and identify a
“specific utility” that “is particular to the subject matter claimed” and “would not be applicable
to a broad class of invention”); see also MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 127, at 231–32.
133. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (holding that to satisfy utility
requirement, the invention must be “refined and developed” to the point “where specific
benefit exists in currently available form”).
134. This Article is not the first to draw the analogy between independent economic value
and utility. See Risch, supra note 5, at 166–67 (observing briefly that trade secret value
“resemble[s] the patent requirement for usefulness”); Graves & Katyal, supra note 8, at 1407
(“The requirement of independent economic value resembles the patent requirement for
usefulness.”).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); see also Hrdy & Sandeen, supra note 1, at 1287–89 (explaining
this secrecy standard).
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information represents “some degree of advance over the common place.”136
The Supreme Court itself once casually suggested that “secrecy, in the
context of trade secrets . . . implies at least minimal novelty.”137
The comparison between secrecy and novelty is misleading. In patent law,
inventions are compared to prior art—printed publications, patents, and the
like—to determine whether they are sufficiently novel and nonobvious to
receive a patent.138 But secrecy, for trade secret law purposes, does not
indicate that information is new when compared to the publicly available
prior art, or even that the information is exclusive to a single company.139
Multiple firms can possess the same trade secret and use it competitively in
private, so long as it is not “generally known” to people in the industry.140
When information’s secrecy is challenged in court, there is no reliable way
to discern what other companies know or do not know behind closed doors.
Unless the information is available in public sources, the parties must rely
mainly on the statements of experts.141
Moreover, even if secrecy does imply “minimal novelty” in the sense of
being unknown to most other firms in an industry, this says little about
whether the information imparts economic value due to its secrecy. Even if
the secret is a fully novel invention in the patent law sense, this does not mean
that it has economic value.142 A new way of performing a task, for instance,
might be new and nonobvious, but it might be much less effective than
methods known in the prior art and, thus, commercially worthless.143
The assumption that secrecy equals value might be appropriate in a world
in which trade secrets were limited to potentially valuable inventions that
many entities in the marketplace are striving to achieve.144 For example, if
the secret is a solution to a recognized problem in a given field, then the fact
that only one or a few firms possess the solution is itself strong evidence that
136. 1 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 5, § 1.08.
137. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
138. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103; see also Hrdy & Sandeen, supra note 1, at 1278–84.
139. See Hrdy & Sandeen, supra note 1, at 1288–1307.
140. Id. at 1288, 1315–16; see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985),
14 U.L.A. 637 (2021) (“If the principal persons who can obtain economic benefit from
information are aware of it, there is no trade secret.”).
141. See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Lafarge N. Am. Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 748, 764 (N.D.
Ill. 2009) (permitting defendant’s technical expert to “opine on what information constitutes
a trade secret, based on what was known and generally available in the wallboard industry at
the time in question”).
142. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (providing that an invention cannot be patented if it was,
among other things, in “public use” or described in a “printed publication”).
143. Courts held early in patent law’s history “that an invention need not ‘supersede all
other inventions now in practice’ or even be commercially useful at all.” See Risch, supra note
23, at 1204 (quoting Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817)); see also Risch,
A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 67 (2011).
144. William Landes and Judge Richard Posner appear to make this assumption in their
analysis, where they suggest that “inventions” that are successfully kept as trade secrets,
instead of patented and disclosed, are likely to be “nonobvious and deserving of some legal
protection” under patent law standards, since others in the field, by definition, do not know
the invention and have failed to figure it out despite striving to reinvent it. LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 52, at 358.
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it is valuable to the holder and would be to others, too. But the assumption
that secrecy equals value is unfounded with respect to the larger universe of
trade secrets. Certainly, the classic example of a trade secret is a
tremendously valuable formula or process that competitors only wish they
could replicate.145 But putative trade secrets can be run-of-the-mill
modifications to well-known processes and products.146 They can be
business methods like how to run a group meeting or information like the
identities of customers and clients.147
In sum, even a company’s best-kept secrets might be commercially
worthless, especially if they were vetted against what is known in the rest of
the industry. Secrecy does not necessarily indicate economic value due to
secrecy.
B. Secrecy Precautions May Not Be Probative of Economic Value
from Secrecy
Another wrong assumption is that independent economic value can be
inferred from the fact that the plaintiff took special precautions to keep the
information secret. Under the law, anyone seeking to protect information as
a trade secret must show that they used “reasonable” secrecy measures,148
such as safes, passwords, firewalls, and nondisclosure agreements.149 Some
courts reason that a plaintiff’s efforts to restrict access to information indicate
that the information is valuable and even necessary for “maintaining an
advantage over its competitors.”150 As Elizabeth Rowe observes, courts tend
to see a “direct relationship between the value of the information and the
extent to which the company made efforts to protect it.”151 The reasoning is
that if information were highly valuable, the company would try hard to

145. Cf. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 430–31 (3d Cir. 1982)
(finding for plaintiff, Rohm & Haas, where defendant, Adco, had been actively striving,
without success, to replicate plaintiff’s process for making a popular vehicle for latex paint).
146. See 1 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 5, § 1.09[4].
147. Id. § 1.09[7].
148. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); see also David W. Slaby, James C. Chapman & Gregory P.
O’Hara, Trade Secret Protection: An Analysis of the Concept “Efforts Reasonable Under the
Circumstances to Maintain Secrecy,” 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 321, 323
(1989).
149. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Trade Secrecy, Innovation, and the Requirement of
Reasonable Secrecy Precautions, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK
OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 46, 46–60, 60 n.56; Varadarajan, supra note
9, at 390.
150. See, e.g., Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandhu, 291 F. Supp. 3d 659, 675 (E.D. Pa. 2018)
(“These documents contain information that was not available outside Teva because it was
classified as confidential and Teva took measures to restrict access to it. Its value was essential
to Teva’s maintaining an advantage over its competitors.”); see also Gen. Sec., Inc. v. Com.
Fire & Sec., Inc., No. 17-CV-1194, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105794, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 25,
2018).
151. Elizabeth A. Rowe, Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets,
17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 10 (2009).
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protect it, whereas few rational entities would bother to spend resources
guarding worthless information.152
However, it is not true that any information that entities bother to keep
secret is valuable. Gone are the days when keeping secrets primarily meant
building an unbreakable vault or placing a massive roof over a chemical
plant.153 In practice, the most important secrecy measures may be legal, like
having everyone sign nondisclosure agreements,154 and digital, like
mandating that everyone use two-factor authentication.155 To be sure,
increasing digitization of information and increasing use of machines in the
workplace can make the misappropriation of trade secrets easier. Hackers
can spy, collect, and countermand from a distance, and employees can
transfer data with the click of a button.156 But automation can also facilitate
secrecy. When the only entities interacting with the secrets are machines,
fewer standard secrecy precautions—physical or legal—would be required
to prevent human workers from taking the information when they leave.157
There are also considerable economies of scale in keeping secrets. If a large
company has a secrecy plan in place, adding more information is not
necessarily more expensive. In fact, it might be more costly for a large
company to sift through everything and decide what is valuable and what is
not. As a recent report from the Sedona Conference working group on trade
secrets observes, the value of information retained by a company “may range
from ‘crown jewels’ to ephemeral data of minimal value.”158 It may be
extremely tempting for a company to keep all of its information secret using
the same measures, irrespective of value.159
152. Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1401, 1409 n.35
(2014) (discussing Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 174,
179–80 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also, e.g., Cemen Tech, Inc. v. Three D Indus., LLC, 753 N.W.2d
1, 8–9 (Iowa 2008).
153. See, e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir.
1970) (“To require DuPont to put a roof over the unfinished plant to guard its secret would
impose an enormous expense to prevent nothing more than a school boy’s trick.”).
154. Varadarajan, supra note 2, at 1557–62 (discussing courts’ tendency to allow the mere
use of nondisclosure agreements to satisfy plaintiff’s obligation to prove reasonable secrecy
precautions).
155. See Rowe, supra note 151, at 36 (noting that “technological tools such as firewalls,
user monitoring, and encryption are now more widely used to protect data”); see also Jonathan
Green, Trade Secrets and Data Security: A Proposed Minimum Standard of Reasonable Data
Security Efforts When Seeking Trade Secret Protection for Consumer Information, 46 CUMB.
L. REV. 181, 183 (2016) (proposing a “minimum standard of reasonable data-security
protection within trade secret law when certain trade secret information is generated from or
contains consumer information”).
156. Elizabeth Rowe, Trade Secrets, Data Security and Employees, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
749, 749–50 (2010) (addressing challenges of maintaining secrecy in a digital world).
157. Jeanne C. Fromer, Machines as the New Oompa-Loompas: Trade Secrecy, the Cloud,
Machine Learning, and Automation, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 706, 717–27 (2019).
158. See THE SEDONA CONF., COMMENTARY ON PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS THROUGHOUT
THE EMPLOYMENT LIFE CYCLE 1, 24 (2021), https://thesedonaconference.org/downloadpublication?fid=5836 [https://perma.cc/E8LT-7JLB] (click on terms agreement and then
“Download”).
159. The Sedona report does not condone this. Instead, it has urged companies to adopt a
“tailored” approach to protecting trade secrets that takes into account the value of the

582

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

In sum, it is quite possible that a lot of the information that companies
successfully keep secret is not very valuable. Of course, a plaintiff’s secrecy
precautions might supply decent circumstantial evidence of economic
advantage from secrecy if the plaintiff shows that they took significant
secrecy precautions, and those precautions were tailored specifically to the
information at issue. On the flip side, the fact that a plaintiff took virtually
no secrecy precautions could demonstrate a lack of independent economic
value, since this conduct is inconsistent with the assertion that information is
valuable due to its secrecy.160 But as a general matter, it is wrong for courts
to infer that the mere existence of secrecy precautions is sufficient for a
finding of independent economic value.
C. “Sweat Work” Does Not Equal Economic Value from Secrecy
One of the most common forms of evidence used to support independent
economic value is the time, effort, and money that the plaintiff used to
develop the information.161 Under the common law, one factor that courts
assessed in deciding whether a trade secret existed was “the amount of effort
or money expended by [the plaintiff] in developing the information.”162
Under the UTSA163 and now the DTSA,164 many courts use time, effort, and
information, among other things, id. at 1, 5, 7, and urges employers to “be mindful not to
sweep in information that is not their trade secrets” if they wish to protect this later on in court.
Id. at 25.
160. Abrasic 90 Inc. v. Weldcote Metals, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 3d 888, 898 (N.D. Ill. 2019)
(denying motion for preliminary injunction).
161. See, e.g., 1 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 5, § 1.07A (noting courts will “generally
conclude” that the necessary value element is met so long as the secret “would require cost,
time, and effort to duplicate” (footnote omitted)).
162. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1939); see also TURNER,
supra note 38, at 107–12 (reviewing cases assessing expenditure of time, money, or work,
often as evidence of other factors like secrecy, novelty, or value).
163. See, e.g., De Lage Landen Operational Servs., LLC v. Third Pillar Sys., Inc., 693 F.
Supp. 2d 423, 439 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“Furthermore, we credit the testimony of Martinko and
Milone that the development of the use cases took ten full-time employees over two years to
complete. This expenditure of time and money by DLL substantiates DLL’s claim that they
have independent economic value.”); Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc., 126 F.3d 645, 650 (5th Cir.
1997) (finding ship mold had independent economic value because, among other things, “it
had cost $1 million and had taken nine months to construct the 90 foot ship mold”); see also,
e.g., ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (N.D. Ill. 1990); KCH
Servs., Inc. v. Vanaire, Inc., No. 05-777-C, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73059, at *1–2, *8–9
(W.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2008); AvidAir Helicopter Supply, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 663 F.3d
966, 972 (8th Cir. 2011); Dayton Superior Corp. v. Yan, No. 12-CV-380, 2013 LEXIS 55922,
at *35–36 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2013).
164. For example, in Medidata Solutions v. Veeva Systems, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the
complaint plausibly alleged independent economic value under the DTSA for a variety of
reasons, including because the plaintiff Medidata had “spent a great deal of time and money,
$500 million, developing its technology.” No. 17 Civ. 589, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199763, at
*10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2018); see also, e.g., Brock Servs., LLC v. Rogillio, No. 18-867, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231954, at *18 (M.D. La. June 17, 2019) (finding that information has
independent economic value because plaintiff “invests significant time, money, and energy”
into research and development); Trahan v. Lazar, 457 F. Supp. 3d 323, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(finding that information has independent economic value because plaintiff alleges that its “IP
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money as evidence that the statutory requirement of independent economic
value has been met. Irrespective of whether this approach was appropriate
under the common law—which, again, used a factor-based analysis165—it is
not appropriate under the statutory regime.
Value that comes purely from investment of time, effort, and money is
called “sweat work” or “sweat of the brow.”166 In patent, copyright, and
trademark law, sweat work alone is an insufficient basis for asserting an
intellectual property right. No matter how much is invested in research and
development, or in advertising and marketing, other substantive criteria like
novelty, originality, and distinctiveness govern protectability.167 The
assumption seems to be that trade secret law does accept sweat work as a
sufficient basis for obtaining an intellectual property right, so long as the
information is kept secret.168
It is true that, as one factor in the analysis, sweat work helps support the
assertion that information has value from secrecy. If a plaintiff spent $500
million in development, the information is more likely to impart a
competitive advantage than if the plaintiff had spent $10. However, sweat
work is, at best, only circumstantial evidence of value from secrecy.169 To
others, the information might be easy to develop and only marginally
valuable. As the Minnesota Supreme Court observed in the early days of the
UTSA, sweat work is a “possible element of proof” but does “not support a
finding of competitive advantage unless . . . a prospective competitor could

was very valuable and developed through great effort . . . [and was] the product of extensive
research, sweat equity, and ingenuity, and worth many millions of dollars” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Castellano Cosm. Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Rashae Doyle, P.A., No. 21-CV1088, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140610, at *14–15 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2021) (finding that
customer list has independent economic value based on testimony “that return customers
comprised a substantial source of revenue” and “that the practice cultivated the email list over
many years and that it had expended many resources to create the list”).
165. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
166. PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY, ROBERT P. MERGES & SHYAMKRISHNA
BALGANESH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2020, at 3–4
(2020).
167. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591
(2013); see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Co., 499 U.S. 340, 354–61 (1991); see
also, e.g., Snyder’s Lance, Inc. v. Frito-Lay N. Am., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 3d 371, 381 (W.D.N.C.
2021) (noting that “[n]o matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has
poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise,” it cannot protect a generic term (quoting
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976))).
168. See Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the
Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516, 518 & n.7 (1981); Jane C.
Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1873–1916 (1990); see also Risch, supra note 5, at 166–67 (asserting
with respect to value that “minimal ‘sweat of the brow’ is usually sufficient for protection”);
1 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 5, § 1.07A (noting courts will “generally conclude” that the
necessary value element is met so long as the secret would require cost, time, and effort to
duplicate).
169. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Ent., Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(“Independent economic value can be evidenced by ‘circumstantial evidence of the resources
invested in producing the information.’” (quoting Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1253 (N.D. Cal. 1995))).
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not produce a comparable [object] without a similar expenditure of time and
money.”170 Worse yet, what if the information were costly to develop for the
plaintiff, but the most valuable part of the information was in fact generally
known in the industry? This would contradict the entire premise that the law
protects only secret information, and not public or generally known
information.
Some courts assume that substantial investment in development
necessarily supports a finding of economic advantage due to secrecy, because
anyone who gets the information from the plaintiff, instead of developing it
themselves, necessarily saves “substantial development expense[s].”171 But
the fact that a former employee, or the competitor who hires them, saves time
and money does not show that the information imparted an economic
advantage from secrecy at the time of the alleged misappropriation. For
example, imagine that a longtime employee departs with information that
they learned while working for their former employer—say, certain lines of
software code that the employee developed for the company years ago.
Further imagine that the employee continues to use the software code at a
new job on behalf of a new company. The employee, as well as their new
employer, may benefit to some degree from the employee’s continued use of
the code because the employer would otherwise have needed to develop the
same code, or an alternative, on their own dime. But the mere existence of
this benefit to the new employer does not prove that the software code gave
the original company an economic advantage due to secrecy. It shows, at
best, that the employee and the new employer have been unjustly enriched.
But being unjustly enriched by another’s efforts is not the same thing as
misappropriating another’s trade secret.172
Of course, the original
company’s investment in developing the code can support economic
170. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn. 1983)
(emphasis added).
171. See id.; see also Slaby et al., supra note 148, at 324 (“A trade secret has commercial
value if it derives independent economic value from being secret, or if substantial time and
money would be required of a competitor to develop the same information.”); Kurt M.
Saunders & Nina Golden, Skill or Secret?—The Line Between Trade Secrets and Employee
General Skills and Knowledge, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 61, 72 (2018) (“In assessing economic
value, courts tend to look for evidence of how the information is useful—how much time,
labor, or money it saves—and whether these are more than trivial in giving the business a
competitive edge.”); see also, e.g., Source Prod. & Equip. Co. v. Schehr, No. CV 16-17528,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138407, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2017) (“By misappropriating these
technologies, defendants allegedly will be able to compete with plaintiffs without investing
the time and resources required to develop the technologies independently. The secrecy of
plaintiffs’ technologies therefore has independent economic value.” (footnote omitted)).
172. See Hrdy & Lemley, supra note 5, at 38–41. This assumption is especially curious
because unjust enrichment is a common law claim that in many jurisdictions is preempted by
state trade secret statutes. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A.
818–19 (2021) (preempting noncontract claims that provide civil remedies for
misappropriation of a trade secret); see also Charles Tait Graves & Elizabeth Tippett, UTSA
Preemption and the Public Domain: How Courts Have Overlooked Patent Preemption of
State Law Claims Alleging Employee Wrongdoing, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 59, 61 (2012); see
also, e.g., Hauck Mfg. Co. v. Astec Indus., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 649, 656 (E.D. Tenn. 2004);
Yeiser Rsch. & Dev. LLC v. Teknor Apex Co., 281 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1049 (S.D. Cal. 2017).
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advantage due to secrecy, given the presence of other factors like a showing
that the company’s use of the code improved its performance compared to
others, or that the company was secretly licensing the code to others for a fee.
But sweat work alone should not be treated as dispositive.
In sum, it makes little sense to assume that information imparts an
economic advantage due to secrecy just because it cost the plaintiff time,
effort, and money to develop, and another entity might be saved from
incurring the same costs.
D. Most Trade Secret Litigation Involves Information Obtained Lawfully
What if the defendant has also gone out of their way to obtain the
information? Does that not supply the necessary additional element of proof?
Here, things get trickier. One common refrain is that the very fact that a
defendant in a trade secret case is trying to use or disclose the information
supports the assumption that the information must impart economic
advantage from secrecy. As one court put it, in such a case, the defendant’s
mere desire to obtain the information is itself “circumstantial proof of its
value,” since “[t]here would be little purpose in using the information if
defendants did not believe the information was valuable.”173
Sometimes, this logic works. If the entity accused of trying to access a
secret is an outsider—a competitor, an unrelated third party, a foreign
entity—then that might help validate the information’s perceived economic
value. Why else would the defendant have obtained “wrongful knowledge”
of the information after actively seeking it out?174 But this is not necessarily
true in all or even most trade secret cases. Most trade secret lawsuits are not
brought against outsiders who are caught red-handed trying to steal the crown
jewels. Most trade secret cases are brought against insiders—a company’s
own employees or business partners—who have obtained the information
lawfully through the course of their work or business dealings with the
plaintiff. The defendant may be a departing employee who is continuing to
use the tools they lawfully acquired, or developed themself, in their former
job. It is incorrect to assume that the employee’s mere continuing use shows
that the information does or ever did impart economic advantage due its
secrecy.

173. Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 692 (D. Minn. 1986), aff’d, 828
F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987).
174. Id. (“If the idea of another saves a person who has wrongful knowledge of it time and
money, such person has been materially benefited and the information has economic value.”);
see also, e.g., GlobalTranz Enters. Inc. v. Murphy, No. CV-18-04819-PHX, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 58689, at *31 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 2021) (“[Plaintiff] GTZ alleges the information’s
secrecy is valuable. GTZ argues that [defendant] Murphy’s ‘extreme steps to siphon [the KIK
information] to his personal email account’ demonstrates the inherent value and usefulness of
the information.” (citation omitted)).
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E. Plaintiffs Have Plentiful External Motivations for Bringing
Trade Secret Lawsuits
What about the fact that the plaintiff is bothering to bring the lawsuit? A
surprisingly common assumption is that plaintiffs will only bring trade secret
lawsuits if the asserted information has at least “potential” economic
value.175 However, it is absolutely plausible that plaintiffs would incur the
costs of going to court to “protect” information that is not itself valuable
enough to justify such costs.
Companies and individuals go to court for all kinds of reasons. There are
several obvious motivations for pursuing a trade secret lawsuit that have
nothing to do with the value of the information per se. One obvious motive
is simple enmity. Maybe the plaintiff is angry that the defendant used or
disclosed certain information in breach of a duty of confidentiality. Another
plausible motive is a desire to deter competition. Maybe the plaintiff is using
the lawsuit for strategic reasons—for example, to push a competitor out of
the same market space or to deter a future competitor from entering.176 In a
different vein, perhaps the plaintiff is an employer who is suing a departing
“star employee” for the sole purpose of preventing them from leaving. An
obvious way to do that is to threaten, or bring, a trade secret lawsuit.177
Lastly, perhaps the plaintiff just does not want the information to get out due
to the potential harm to its reputation upon disclosure.178
All of these are plausible motives to sue and are not necessarily illogical
ones. However, none of them proves or even necessarily supports the
argument that information derives economic value from secrecy.
III. AN EMERGING TREND IN THE COURTS
The conventional wisdom has been that courts do not usually scrutinize a
plaintiff’s assertions of independent economic value.179 Recently, however,
since the passage of the DTSA, trade secret practitioners have observed more
instances of courts dismissing trade secret cases for failure to satisfy the
independent economic value requirement.180 This part reviews recent DTSA
175. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 557; QUINTO & SINGER, supra note 122, at 103.
176. See Sharon K. Sandeen & Elizabeth A. Rowe, Debating Employee Non-Competes and
Trade Secrets, 33 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 438, 455–64 (2017) (debating
the view that noncompete agreements and related legal restraints are anticompetitive).
177. Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 167, 169–70 (2005).
178. See Graves & Katyal, supra note 8, at 1404 (discussing seclusion for purpose of
avoiding reputational harm).
179. See supra notes 5, 121–25 and accompanying text.
180. For example, trade secrets expert Victoria Cundiff wrote in a 2019 Practising Law
Institute report that “[t]he UTSA and DTSA’s requirement that information claimed to be a
trade secret must have independent economic value (actual or potential) is often overlooked[,
but] the past year has brought renewed attention to this prong.” Cundiff, supra note 11, at 73;
see also ROWE & SANDEEN, supra note 5, at 177 (stating, without citing to specific case
examples, that “numerous federal courts have considered Motions to Dismiss in which it was
asserted that the economic value requirement was not properly pleaded”). A 2020 Law360
article proclaimed that independent economic value is “crucial” in trade secret cases. Robert
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cases from a variety of jurisdictions in which independent economic value
appeared to be dispositive in the court’s decision to dismiss or deny a motion
for an injunction. This review suggests that some courts are indeed taking
independent economic value more seriously, refusing to accept assertions of
independent economic value based on the usual circumstantial evidence.
A. The Turning Point
Before moving to the DTSA cases, it is important to mention a very
significant pre-DTSA case called Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems
Corp.181 Several practitioners cite Yield as representing a turning point in
how courts assess independent economic value.182 The plaintiff, Yield, was
a software company alleging that its former employee misappropriated eight
segments of source code that he had developed while employed at Yield.183
Upon departure, the former employee used the eight code routines to make a
competing product at his new company, TEA.184 Yield sued for
misappropriation under California’s UTSA but lost after a bench trial due to
its failure to prove independent economic value.185 On appeal, Yield
conceded that the eight secret code routines did not involve “any new or
innovative advances in software programming,” and that much of the code
came from public sources.186 Yield nonetheless argued that the secret
elements of the code were valuable because they “would provide ‘some help’
and ‘save time’ for a programmer” wanting to achieve similar functionality—
that was presumably why the departing employee continued to use it.187
However, in a lengthy opinion, a California appeals court held for the
defendant. Merely stating that something is “helpful or useful” or might
“save someone time,” the court wrote, was not enough to prove that Yield
derived an economic advantage from retaining the secrecy of those eight code
routines.188 The court rejected the usual circumstantial evidence. For
example, the court noted that the fact that Yield kept all the code secret did

Manley, Phillip Aurentz, Kevin McElroy & John Bone, ‘Independent Economic Value’
Crucial in Trade Secret Cases, LAW360 (June 23, 2020, 5:20 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1283638 [https://perma.cc/QR4V-NPNH] (citing Plastronics Socket Partners Ltd. v.
Highrel Inc., No. CV-18-03201-PHX, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78569, at *10–11 (D. Ariz. May
9, 2019)); see also Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Sys. Corp., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 18 (Ct. App.
2007).
181. 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 7 (Ct. App. 2007).
182. See Robert B. Milligan, Recent California Appellate Decision Finds that Company
Failed to Demonstrate that Its Source Code Had Independent Economic Value, SEYFARTH
(Nov. 29, 2007), https://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2007/11/articles/trade-secrets/recentcalifornia-appellate-decision-finds-that-company-failed-to-demonstrate-that-its-source-codehad-independent-economic-value/ [https://perma.cc/97PH-568X]; Manley et al., supra note
180, at 1–2 (citing Yield as an example of value being “crucial” in trade secret cases).
183. Yield Dynamics, Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 7–9.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 15–16, 18–19, 19 n.15.
187. Id. at 17–21.
188. Id. at 18.
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not prove that the nonpublic parts of the code derived independent economic
value from secrecy:
Yield’s protection of its code from general disclosure could hardly show
that the eight routines at issue possessed independent economic value.
Apparently it kept all of its code confidential, even though some of it came
from outside sources, including public ones.
. . . . A decision to view information as confidential thus reflects at most
an opinion that secrecy may be advantageous.189

The holding in Yield was surprising to practitioners who viewed the
opinion as diverging from what other courts had required for a finding of
independent economic value under the UTSA. As Robert Milligan put it,
Yield adds “an additional wrinkle” by emphasizing that “[s]ecrecy and
usefulness alone will not establish independent economic value.”190 Instead,
Yield’s heightened standard meant that a plaintiff would have to show that
the claimed information gave it an economic advantage precisely because it
was kept secret, and that the asserted economic value of the information came
specifically from its secret elements.
B. Skepticism Among Federal Courts Applying the DTSA
Since the passage of the DTSA in 2016, several federal district courts have
followed the approach in Yield in the pretrial stages of litigation, dismissing
cases or denying motions for preliminary injunctions when plaintiffs fail to
plead or sufficiently prove independent economic value.191 This section
189. Id. at 19–20.
190. Milligan, supra note 182, at 1.
191. Ukrainian Future Credit Union v. Seikaly, No. 17-cv-11483, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
194165, at *25 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 27, 2017) (applying motion to dismiss standard and denying
plaintiff’s motion to add a DTSA claim); Elsevier Inc. v. Dr. Evidence, LLC, No. 17-cv-5540,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10730, at *17–18 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2018) (granting motion to
dismiss); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410, 448 (S.D.N.Y.
2019) (granting motion to dismiss); Signal Fin. Holdings LLC v. Looking Glass Fin. LLC,
No. 17 C 8816, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15106, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2018) (limiting scope
of preliminary injunction to exclude draft agreements); Plastronics Socket Partners Ltd. v.
Highrel Inc., No. CV-18-03201-PHX, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78569, at *14 (D. Ariz. May 9,
2019) (granting motion to dismiss with leave to amend); ATS Grp., LLC v. Legacy Tank &
Indus. Servs. LLC, 407 F. Supp. 3d 1186, 1198 (W.D. Okla. 2019) (granting motion to dismiss
with leave to amend); Abrasic 90 Inc. v. Weldcote Metals, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 3d 888, 898
(N.D. Ill. 2019) (denying motion for preliminary injunction); Kairam v. West Side GI, LLC,
793 F. App’x 23, 28 (2d. Cir. 2019) (holding district court properly dismissed but should have
granted leave to amend); Danaher Corp. v. Gardner Denver, Inc., No. 19-CV-1794, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 89674, at *45 (E.D. Wis. May 20, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss); Intrepid
Fin. Partners, LLC v. Fernandez, No. 20 CV 9779, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 244742, at *12–13
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss); Attia v. Google LLC, 983 F.3d 420,
425–26 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss); Payward, Inc. v. Runyon, No.
20-cv-02130, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173907, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2020) (granting
motion to dismiss with leave to amend); Zirvi v. Flatley, 433 F. Supp. 3d 448, 465 (S.D.N.Y.
2020) (granting motion to dismiss); NEXT Payment Sols., Inc. v. CLEAResult Consulting,
Inc., No. 17-cv-8829, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94764, at *31–32 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2020)
(granting summary judgment); 24 Seven, LLC v. Martinez, 19-CV-7320, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15480, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2021) (granting motion to dismiss); Sirius Comput.
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discusses these cases. They are divided into four categories based on the
reason that the court gave for why the independent economic value
requirement was not satisfied.
Importantly, the courts in these cases are acting in the very early stages of
litigation. For a variety of reasons, most trade secret cases focus exclusively
on pretrial relief; the cases rarely go to trial.192 The typical procedural
posture in these cases is an order on the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
injunction or an order on the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim.193 As a result, courts are usually hesitant to force plaintiffs to expose
the full details of their secrets before a protective order is in place, and thus,
they give plaintiffs time to develop their claims.194 This makes these recent
opinions—many of which dismissed the case with prejudice—all the more
significant.
1. No Plausible Assertion of Independent Economic Value
In the first category of DTSA cases, courts found that plaintiffs failed to
provide plausible evidence, or at least a plausible story, for how their
information imparted independent economic value. Instead, the plaintiffs in
these cases attempted to rely on other factors—in particular, the fact that they
took reasonable measures to keep the information secret.195 Courts have
found this reasoning to be insufficient in demonstrating economic advantage
from secrecy.
For example, in ATS Group, LLC v. Legacy Tank & Industrial Services
LLC,196 the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
dismissed a DTSA claim for failure to demonstrate independent economic
value.197 The alleged trade secrets ran the gamut from information about
“ongoing or prospective jobs” to “pricing and profit margins,” to “software,

Sols., Inc. v. Sachs, No. 20-cv-1432, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77595, at *10–11 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
22, 2021) (granting motion to dismiss).
192. See THE SEDONA CONF., COMMENTARY ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES IN TRADE SECRET
LITIGATION 10–24 (2021), https://thesedonaconference.org/download-publication?fid=6186
[https://perma.cc/K3DS-5VS8]. See generally Elizabeth Rowe, eBay, Permanent Injunctions,
and Trade Secrets, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 553 (2020).
193. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a) (preliminary injunction); id. 65(b) (temporary restraining
order); see also id. 12(b)(6) (a party may assert a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted”).
194. For examples of courts expressing concern about forcing disclosure of secrets during
litigation, see Mighty Deer Lick, Inc. v. Morton Salt, Inc., No. 17-cv-05875, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23206, at *12–14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2020); Copart, Inc. v. Sparta Consulting, Inc., 277
F. Supp. 3d 1127, 1153–55 (E.D. Cal. 2017); Design Nine, Inc. v. Arch Rail Grp., LLC,
No. 18 CV 428, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49079, at *12 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 25, 2019).
195. See, e.g., Elsevier Inc., LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10730, at *17–18 (dismissing
New York and DTSA claims, holding that “the only factor under New York law that
[counter-plaintiff] does address is the third—the extent of measures taken to safeguard the
information [and t]aking steps to protect information through a confidentiality agreement does
not, on its own, suggest the existence of . . . bona fide trade secrets”).
196. 407 F. Supp. 3d 1186 (W.D. Okla. 2019).
197. See id. at 1197. As is common in these DTSA cases, the plaintiff also brought a state
law claim under Oklahoma’s version of the UTSA. See id. at 1198.
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processes and procedures” to “customer names.”198 The court found that the
plaintiff, ATS, sufficiently pled that it took reasonable measures to maintain
secrecy,199 but indicated that maintaining secrecy alone was not enough.
ATS completely failed to allege that the information it had “designated” as
trade secrets derived “‘independent economic value’ from remaining
confidential” or “provided it with a competitive advantage.”200 Thus, the
court dismissed the complaint, though it gave the plaintiff leave to amend.201
The plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint, in which it took pains to
explain how its information gave it a competitive advantage, using the words
“competitive advantage” at least ten times.202
2. Economic Value Not Specifically from Secrecy
A second line of DTSA cases reveals courts fleshing out the most subtle
feature of independent economic value: the requirement of a causal
connection between value and secrecy. Courts chastened plaintiffs who
failed to explain precisely how the value they identified came from the
information’s secrecy. Merely asserting that information had “value” in a
holistic sense, or that others would save time and money if they obtained it,
was not sufficient.203
For example, in Danaher Corp. v. Gardner Denver, Inc.,204 the plaintiff
asserted trade secret protection for a “Growth Room Template” that was
essentially an internal teaching document used by employees to conduct “a
growth-focused meeting.”205 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin denied a preliminary injunction and granted defendant’s
motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to explain how the Growth
Room Template derived economic value from its secrecy.206 The Growth
Room Template was kept generally secret within the company, and it may
have been valuable in a holistic sense because it helped “guide development
meetings” and enabled the “organization to operate in a consistent
fashion.”207 But the plaintiff failed to identify anything specific about the

198. Id. at 1198–99.
199. The court found that the plaintiff’s provision of confidentiality policies in the
employee handbook, as well as its use of password protections and access restrictions, were
sufficient to satisfy reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy. Id. at 1199.
200. Id. at 1200.
201. Id.
202. See Amended Complaint, ATS Grp., LLC v. Legacy Tank & Indus. Servs. LLC, 407
F. Supp. 3d 1186 (W.D. Okla. 2019) (No. CIV-18-994-R), 2019 WL 6178620.
203. See, e.g., Signal Fin. Holdings LLC v. Looking Glass Fin. LLC, No. 17 C 8816, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15106, at *5–6, *16 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2018) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument
that draft employee agreements had independent economic value because they could “serve
as templates for future agreements, thereby saving it legal fees” and save development costs,
because the draft agreements did not derive their economic value from secrecy and in fact
would have existed “even if the documents were public”).
204. No. 19-CV-1794, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89674 (E.D. Wis. May 20, 2020).
205. Id. at *3, *20, *24.
206. Id. at *30–31, *45.
207. Id. at *30.
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Growth Room Template that derived value from its secrecy.208 The Growth
Room Template’s value, the court wrote, does not lie “in its secrecy from
others,” but only in what it represents for the plaintiff’s own employees—
“an ability to conduct a growth and development meeting effectively.”209
“Certainly, a well-run growth and development department will impart value
to its company—that is the entire point. But simply because information is
valuable does not mean that it is a trade secret.”210 The court permanently
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim without leave to amend.211
3. Mere Threat of Harm upon Disclosure Is Not Enough
In another line of DTSA cases, courts found plaintiffs’ allegations of
independent economic value to be insufficient because plaintiffs asserted
merely that disclosure would be harmful to them without explaining how the
information gave them an economic advantage over others. For example, in
Democratic National Committee v. Russian Federation,212 the Democratic
National Committee (DNC) filed a lawsuit alleging, among other things, that
the Russian government violated the DTSA by obtaining trade secrets from
the DNC’s computers and leaking them to WikiLeaks.213 The complaint
described the DNC’s alleged trade secrets as consisting of “donor lists” and
“fundraising strategies.”214
The DNC’s claim was not frivolous. As noted above, nonprofit entities
have successfully protected their donor lists as trade secrets.215 But the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed without leave
to amend,216 holding that the DNC had not identified anything economically
valuable about its donor lists or fundraising strategies, or “shown how their
particular value derive[d] from their secrecy.”217 Instead, the DNC alleged
only that disclosure of this information would be bad because it “would
reveal critical insights into the DNC’s political, financial, and voter
engagement strategies.”218 Merely asserting that disclosure would somehow
be harmful to the DNC, the court’s dismissal suggested, was not the same as
explaining how it gave the DNC an economic advantage over other
entities.219
A court made a similar determination in Ukrainian Future Credit Union v.
Seikaly,220 holding that merely asserting negative “regulatory consequences”
208. Id. at *30–31 (“Danaher has not alleged facts to support the requirement that the
Growth Room Template’s value is derived from the information’s secrecy . . . .”).
209. Id. at *30–31.
210. Id. at *31.
211. Id. at *45.
212. 392 F. Supp. 3d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
213. Id. at 417–19.
214. Id. at 436, 448.
215. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
216. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 392 F. Supp. 3d at 451 (dismissing with prejudice).
217. Id. at 448.
218. Id. at 436.
219. Id. at 436, 448.
220. No. 17-cv-11483, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194165 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 27, 2017).
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due to disclosure of certain customer information did not prove that the
information afforded plaintiff “a competitive advantage by having value to
the owner and potential competitors.”221 The complaint emphasized the
plaintiff’s need for the information to remain confidential and the negative
consequences of disclosure, but it said “nothing about the economic value of
the information to a competitor or anyone else.”222
4. Undeveloped Ideas and Stale Information
In a final line of DTSA cases, courts suggested that independent economic
value from secrecy, while it might exist at some point in time, was not present
during the correct time frame. Either the requisite value did not yet exist or
it had long since expired.
For example, in Pawelko v. Hasbro, Inc.,223 the plaintiff argued that
Hasbro misappropriated her idea to develop two new Play Doh product lines,
“Play Doh Plus” and “DohVinci.”224 Hasbro argued that the plaintiff’s
product ideas lacked even potential independent economic value because
they were not sufficiently developed and had not been deemed safe and
approved for children.225 The court denied Hasbro’s motion for summary
judgment, stating that “[i]ndependent economic value . . . does not require
that the designs be completely refined, developed, and manufactured.”226
However, the court observed that, at trial, the plaintiff might face a challenge
in proving that her idea was sufficiently developed to satisfy the independent
economic value requirement.227
In another case, the opposite timing problem arose. A court found that the
asserted trade secrets, although they may have been valuable in the past, no
longer had that value. In 24 Seven, LLC v. Martinez,228 the plaintiff alleged
that it owned a “compilation” trade secret consisting of “client names,
candidate names, client contacts, revenues by client, and commission
amounts.”229 The plaintiff, 24 Seven, alleged that it worked hard to develop
the information but failed to explain how the information retained “economic
value . . . vis-à-vis its competitors,” given that significant time had passed.230
In all probability, the court wrote, “the economic edge that 24 Seven’s reports
would give competitors is marginal and would dissipate with the age of the

221. Id. at *24–26.
222. Id.
223. No. 16-00201, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196741 (D.R.I. Nov. 19, 2018).
224. Id. at *1–5.
225. Id. at *12.
226. Id. at *11 (quoting Giasson Aerospace Sci., Inc. v. RCO Eng’g, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d
830, 844 (E.D. Mich. 2010); and then citing Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys,
Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 726–27 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussed at infra notes 298–99 and accompanying
text)).
227. Id. at *18–19.
228. No. 19-CV-7320, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15480 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2021).
229. Id. at *4.
230. Id. at *27.
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report.”231 In the end, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim without leave
to amend.232
IV. A TYPOLOGY OF VALUE FAILURES
A purely descriptive account is useful for those wishing to know how
courts actually behave “on the ground.” It also begs for order and further
analysis. This part draws on the case law, as well as insights from the broader
intellectual property law field, to provide a framework for conceptualizing
independent economic value that can be used to identify, categorize, and
evaluate “value failures” that may arise in the future. Value failures occur
along four dimensions—amount, causation, type, and timing. One or more
of these value failures can arise in virtually any trade secret case. Each
category brings its own policy concerns. This part explains the four value
failures, identifies the associated policy concerns, and shows how the legal
requirement of independent economic value, if properly applied, can prevent
them.
A. Amount Failures
Independent economic value establishes a minimum quantitative threshold
for the value that information must have in order to be a trade secret. An
“amount failure” occurs when a putative trade secret simply does not reach
this minimum threshold. The threshold is not particularly high. Both federal
and state statutes specifically refer to “potential” independent economic
value, suggesting that they contemplate information with modest present
value.233 The Third Restatement’s oft-cited commentary counsels that the
value “need not be great”: “It is sufficient if the secret provides an advantage
that is more than trivial.”234 At a practical level, courts have not generally
required the trade secret owner to “provide a formal valuation of the trade
secret or identify revenues associated with the trade secret.”235
A low threshold for value makes sense. The conventional view of value
in intellectual property law is that markets, not government, should determine
the merit of inventions and creative works and the direction of technological
development.236 Under this view, the value of a trade secret should be
231. Id. at *27–28.
232. Id. at *35. The court granted leave to refile state law claims in state court. Id. But see
Vendavo, Inc. v. Long, 397 F. Supp. 3d 1115, 1133 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (holding that some
information satisfied independent economic value, but information older than three years did
not).
233. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985), 14
U.L.A. 637 (2021).
234. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 1995); see
also, e.g., Smithfield Packaged Meats Sales Corp. v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d
843, 855–56 (S.D. Iowa 2020).
235. 1 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 5, § 1.07A. But see HALLIGAN & WEYAND, supra
note 55, at 122–27 (noting that valuation is a good business practice and can be a requirement
for obtaining damages).
236. For patents, see Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The
Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1062–69 (1988)
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evaluated primarily based on industry’s perceptions of value, not those of
courts or government officials.237
However, a low standard is not the same as no standard, and there must be
a standard. There is an infinite number of secret tidbits that could
theoretically serve as the basis for a trade secret lawsuit.238 James Pooley
offers, as an example, the fact that a company secretly paints its
manufacturing equipment with racing stripes. “[T]hat may be amusing,”
Pooley writes, “but it doesn’t give you any competitive advantage, so it
couldn’t qualify.”239 This is a hypothetical illustration, but in the real world,
trade secret lawsuits can similarly hinge on low-value information whose
competitive advantage is not readily apparent. For example, in one case, a
boating company sued a competitor started by a former employee, asserting
trade secrecy protection in, among other things, the fact that the former
employer used volume discounts.240 Such claims can come from the other
direction too, with employees suing employers over information that their
employer continued to use after they left (although this is far, far less
common). For example, in one recent DTSA case, a former employee
alleged that her employer had misappropriated the billing template that she
had used to optimize billing procedures in her former job.241
Some of these claims may turn out to involve information that is
moderately valuable. But many will not justify a response from the law. As
Judge Richard Posner once observed, the law’s “machinery is far from
costless” and should be reserved for trade secrets with “real value deserving
of legal protection.”242 We may postulate that cost-benefit analysis will
necessarily screen out low-value secrets, for who would protect, let alone sue
(suggesting limited role for patent office in assessing utility of technology); Seymore, supra
note 131, at 1076 (arguing that judging the utility of inventions requires a “subjective and
arbitrary value judgment” as to when or whether an invention is useful enough to count under
the law); Risch, supra note 23, at 1205–06 (explaining why a “commercial utility” standard
might be difficult to administer). For similar views on the “originality” requirement in
copyright, see, for example, Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251
(1903) (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits.”); see also Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 451, 456 (2009); Joseph P. Fishman, Originality’s Other Path, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 861,
863 (2021).
237. But see Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 984–85 (2012) (critiquing assumption that
difficulty in aggregating information in private markets makes it impossible for government
to effectively incentivize innovation); cf. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond
the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 327–28 (2013); Camilla A. Hrdy,
Commercialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 67.
238. See POOLEY, supra note 52, at 63.
239. Id.
240. See Yellowfin Yachts, Inc. v. Barker Boatworks, LLC, 898 F.3d 1279, 1298 (11th Cir.
2018) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment, which found that information
about a volume discount lacked independent economic value).
241. See Kairam v. West Side GI, LLC, 793 F. App’x 23, 28 (2d. Cir. 2019) (holding claim
was properly dismissed for lack of value and reasonable measures, with leave to amend).
242. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179–80 (7th Cir.
1991).
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over, information that lacks value?243 Judge Posner’s assumption, in making
the statement above, was that “the owner’s precautions” serve as “evidence
that the secret has real value.”244 However, as explained above, this
inference is dubious.245 Secrecy need not be costly or narrowly tailored to
what is of value. There are plentiful scenarios in which plaintiffs would be
well served by using virtually valueless information as the basis for a lawsuit.
Perhaps a star employee is trying to depart, and the employer does not want
them to leave for reasons unrelated to trade secrets.246 Perhaps a former
business partner is now directly competing for the same contract. A devious
but rational solution is to identify information to which they had lawful
access and bring a trade secret lawsuit against them.247
This is why courts must be free to use independent economic value to
screen for amount failures. If there were no quantitative standard for value
at all, then many of these shenanigans would be legal, and courts would be
left to deal with the fallout.248 Courts can use the “plausibility” pleading
standard to dismiss baseless claims.249 But without independent economic
value, there would be nothing for courts to object to; they would have to rely
purely on secrecy, reasonable secrecy precautions, and cost-benefit analyses
to control what is protectable. Thanks to independent economic value, courts
can and should dismiss for failure to state a claim when the asserted trade
secret is not quantitatively valuable enough to justify legal protection.
B. Causation Failures
The most subtle feature of independent economic value is that it contains
an implicit causation requirement. The information’s asserted value must
derive specifically from its secrecy. When that is not the case, the
information does not have independent economic value from secrecy, as the
statute requires. This is a “causation failure.”
The causation failure is based on the statutory mandate that a trade secret’s
asserted economic value must come “independently” from the fact that
information is being kept secret. If the information’s economic value does
not accrue from the information’s secrecy, then the information is not a trade
secret.250 To give an obvious example, if the alleged trade secret is the
243. See Kitch, supra note 10, at 697–98; Cundiff, supra note 11, at 73.
244. Rockwell, 925 F.2d at 179.
245. See supra Part II.B.
246. See Camilla A. Hrdy, The General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Paradox,
60 B.C. L. REV. 2409, 2410–12 (2019).
247. See Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. Cal. Custom Shapes, Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358,
368–69 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that trade secret claim against rival for a contract to build a
workbench was specious, in part because the alleged trade secret consisted of the identity of
the parties to the contract, which was known to all).
248. See David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Here Come the Trade Secret Trolls,
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 230, 244 (2015) (arguing that stronger trade secret laws run
the risk of trade secret claims being used as “anti-competitive weapons”).
249. See supra Part III.B.1.
250. Signal Fin. Holdings LLC v. Looking Glass Fin. LLC, No. 17 Civ. 8816, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15106, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2018) (discussed in supra note 203).
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information making up the chemical composition for a drug that treats
cancer, then the economic value of that drug’s composition must be causally
linked to what is secret about it. If most of the composition of the drug is
already well known in the industry, and the only thing that is secret about the
drug is an alteration or addition, it must be the case that the specific secret
alteration or addition gives the holder an economic advantage over others due
to being kept secret from others.
The requirement of a causal connection between value and secrecy raises
the bar on what is needed for protection, and for good reason. Not only can
information that is public not be protected as a trade secret, but secret
information whose value does not stem from secrecy cannot be a trade secret
either. The policy significance of this rule recalls the policy reasoning behind
the secrecy requirement itself. Requiring value to come from secrecy, as
opposed to allowing protections for what is publicly known, is critical to
ensuring that trade secret law does not needlessly interfere with “robust
competition or with the dissemination of new ideas.”251 The practical
significance of this rule is to ensure that remedial assistance from a court in
the form of an injunction will actually help the complaining party. If the
information’s value is not specifically attributable to its secrecy, then an
injunction to preserve the information’s secrecy does not help protect that
value. This is why the Supreme Court once stated that the “economic value”
of the trade secret “property right” lies in the “competitive advantage over
others” that the holder enjoys by virtue of retaining exclusivity, such that
“disclosure or use by others . . . would destroy that competitive edge.”252
Value must come from secrecy, and disclosure must threaten to destroy both
secrecy and value. If this link is not enforced, trade secret law serves a
distinct purpose from protecting the value that lies in secrecy. At best, it
serves only to prevent another from benefiting from the plaintiff’s
investments (i.e., unjust enrichment); at worst, it serves ulterior motives—
restricting competition, restricting mobility, restricting speech, or furthering
mere enmity—that have nothing to do with protecting value.
A powerful illustration of a causation failure in practice is the Yield
Dynamics case, discussed in Part III, where the court held, after a trial, that
the plaintiff’s source code lacked independent economic value. The
functionality provided by the code, and thus the basis for its economic value,
did not derive from the code’s secret parts. Instead, it came from the code’s
public, open-source parts.253 Yield asserted that the lines of code had value
because they “would provide ‘some help’ to a programmer in creating new
routines or a similar function or save time in programming.”254 But unless
there was a causal link between the economic advantage of the code and the

251. Lemley, supra note 4, at 343.
252. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984) (emphasis added).
253. Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Sys. Corp., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 14–15, 15 n.13, 17–18
(Ct. App. 2007).
254. Id. at 17.
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secret parts of the code, the mere fact that the former employee benefitted
from continuing to use the code was not enough.
Unfortunately, many courts do not take this extra step in assessing
economic value. To give a typical example, in Luckyshot LLC v. Runnit CNC
Shop, Inc.,255 the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado found that
a design for a toilet plunger “unquestionably” possessed independent
economic value under the DTSA because the “proprietary plunger design
‘enabled [plaintiff] to market those plungers . . . to customers . . . for
substantial amounts,’” and plaintiff had “generated over $1.3 million in
revenue” from one of its customers over two years.256 The issue should have
been more specific: Did the secret aspects of the plaintiff’s plunger design
permit the plaintiff to market the plunger for “substantial amounts” and help
generate the stated revenues? In other words, did the plunger have value
from secrecy? If the plunger design was valuable due to other factors besides
secrecy—such as the generally known part of the design, the unprotectable
skill, knowledge, and experience of the plaintiff’s employees,257 or the
marketing provided by plaintiff’s brand—then the plunger design did not
derive independent economic value. It was not a trade secret. There are
plentiful other cases revealing similar oversights. Particularly at the pleading
stage, courts do not typically require the plaintiff to directly link the
economic value in question to what is actually a secret.258 If courts begin to
take this causation requirement more seriously, as the Yield court did and as
some courts are doing, the implications for trade secret litigation and
enforcement could be significant.
The causation issue concededly does not arise all the time. Some trade
secrets are entirely secret or secret in all material respects. Thus, there will
be no question that the asserted value derives from secrecy. But causation
failures probably arise far more often than one might assume. Many trade
secrets are made up of a combination of both public and nonpublic
information or consist of a minor divergence from what is already known.259

255. No. 19-cv-03034, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175237 (D. Colo. Sept. 24, 2020).
256. Id. at *4 (second alteration in original).
257. See Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also supra
note 129.
258. Indeed, in an ongoing case, Amimon Inc. v. Shenzen Hollyland Tech Co., a district
court recently implied that these issues did not matter. No. 20 Civ. 9170, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 229162, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2021). Rejecting the defendant’s argument that
the plaintiff, Amimon, had not alleged that its source code imparted “any economic value to
[plaintiffs] or their competitors,” the court wrote that plaintiff’s allegations that it is “a leader
of the video transmission industry” and “spends 5 to 10 million dollars annually to research
and develop new technologies” were sufficient. See id. (“Although Amimon has failed to
allege specifically how much it spent on the Source Code in question, or the current value of
the Source Code, in light of the other information provided, Amimon has alleged sufficient
facts to plausibly assert that the Source Code is a trade secret.”). Spending on research and
development and being an industry leader do not show or even necessarily support that the
specific software code in question derives economic value from secrecy.
259. See ROWE & SANDEEN, supra note 5, at 92. See generally Tait Graves & Alexander
Macgillivray, Combination Trade Secrets and the Logic of Intellectual Property, 20 SANTA
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Within the field of software engineering, for example, a lot of source code
incorporates open-source code.260 This code should only be protectable to
the extent that the secret part of the code imparts an economic advantage.
Similarly, data compilations often consist of private and public data. Courts
often observe that compilations are specifically contemplated in the statutory
text as potentially protectable trade secrets.261 However, compilations of
non-secret and secret information are only protectable to the extent that the
secret aspects of the data, or some unknown combination of all the data,
provide an economic advantage due to secrecy.262 If 99 percent of the data
in the compilation is public, and the secret aspects impart only trivial
additional value, then the compilation as a whole may well not derive
sufficient economic value due to secrecy.
The causation issue can also arise in virtually all cases involving minor
alterations to commonly sold products or general industry knowledge.263 For
example, in the now infamous Waymo LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc.264
case, plaintiff Waymo’s former employee downloaded more than 14,000
files containing designs for autonomous vehicles before he left to work for
defendant, Uber.265 But the information contained in those files was not all
secret.266 Much of it likely consisted of alterations to what engineers already
knew about self-driving cars.267 If the case had not settled, Waymo would
have had to prove that specific secrets within those 14,000 files—which the
judge had narrowed to eight by the time of trial—imparted actual or potential
economic advantage over others.268

CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 261 (2004) (critiquing trade secret protection for
combination trade secrets).
260. See Katyal, supra note 37, at 1252.
261. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A.
636–37 (2021).
262. See, e.g., WHIC LLC v. NextGen Labs., Inc., 341 F. Supp. 3d 1147, 1163 (D. Haw.
2018); Intel Corp. v. Rais, No. 19 Civ. 20, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4932, at *10 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 10, 2019).
263. Compare Kendall Holdings, Ltd. v. Eden Cryogenics LLC, 630 F. Supp. 2d 853, 863
(S.D. Ohio 2008) (holding that “shop drawings” for cryogenic bayonets did not “create
independent economic benefit to Plaintiff by not being known or disclosed to other cryogenics
competitors” because they were indistinguishable from “standardized, non-novel products
widely produced by cryogenics manufacturers”), with Sexual MD Sols., LLC v. Wolff,
No. 20-20824-CIV, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79581, at *40–41 (S.D. Fla. May 6, 2020) (holding
that, although techniques for marketing a sexual wellness product were based in part on
“publicly available, third-party sources,” plaintiff’s “enhancements to the marketing
principles found in third-party sources added economic value” as evidenced by fact that
plaintiff spent “considerable time and money” in developing its marketing plan).
264. See No. C 17-00939, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73843 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2017).
265. See id. at *1.
266. See id.
267. See Hrdy, supra note 246, at 2412–13.
268. Uber was apparently preparing to challenge this point. See Defendants Uber
Technologies, Inc. and Ottomotto LLC’s Opposition to Lyft Inc.’s Motion to Quash Subpoena
at 1, Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 17-00939, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73843 (N.D.
Cal. May 15, 2017), 2017 WL 4174067.
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Recent DTSA cases have been dismissed due to plaintiffs’ failures to
allege value due specifically to secrecy.269 More courts should identify these
causation failures and urge the parties to address them as soon as possible. If
the case does end up going to trial, then it will be up to the plaintiff to prove
whether the asserted economic value really comes from secrecy.270
C. Type Failures
A fundamental function of the independent economic value requirement is
that it constrains the type of value that can be protected as a trade secret.
Unlike patent law, which does not mandate that an invention have any
commercial merit to be protectable,271 trade secret law demands that
information have, specifically, economic value.272 Information whose value
is not sufficiently economic in nature cannot be protected as a trade secret,
no matter how great its perceived value might be. This is a “type failure.”
The fact that trade secrecy looks to information’s economic value instead
of its technical merit is usually framed as an expansion of protectable subject
matter. Trade secret law, as compared to patent law, protects mere business
and market information like customer lists and business strategies, thus
rewarding and incentivizing all sorts of research and experimentation beyond
what occurs in a science lab and might result in a patentable invention.273
However, trade secret law’s insistence that value be of an economic type is
as much a limitation as an expansion of the right. The statutory concept of
economic value sweeps broadly but does not encompass all conceivable
human pursuits. If someone is engaging in purely noneconomic activities
that do not have any economic purpose or impact on the economy, they do
not have a trade secret.274 Examples range from baking cookies for one’s
family using a secret recipe to writing a wedding speech that is not revealed
until the big night.275 Neither the recipe nor the wedding speech is a trade
secret under the law. No matter how much value they have to the owner,
their value is not economic in nature. Even if the baker or the speechwriter
shares their secrets with others under a strict duty of secrecy, which is
thereafter shattered, there is no cause of action under state or federal trade
269. See, e.g., Danaher Corp. v. Gardner Denver, Inc., No. 19-CV-1794, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89674, at *26–27 (E.D. Wis. May 20, 2020) (finding that growth template used
internally to run meetings did not derive value from secrecy).
270. Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Sys. Corp., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 14–18 (Ct. App. 2007).
271. Cf. Risch, supra note 23, at 1204.
272. See supra Part I.B.
273. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485–93 (1974); see also LANDES
& POSNER, supra note 52, at 359–60; Risch, supra note 5, at 154; Lemley, supra note 4, at
329–30; see also, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 390–91 (2007) (arguing that trade secrets rightly
protect so-called market experimentation along with technological experimentation).
274. Again, “noneconomic” does not mean “nonprofit.” Courts have long since concluded
that nonprofit entities can own trade secrets irrespective of their tax status. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1995).
275. But see Peggy Lawton Kitchens, Inc. v. Hogan, 466 N.E.2d 138, 139–40 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1984) (holding that chocolate chip cookie recipe used by a commercial bakery “had
competitive value so far as [plaintiff] was concerned”).
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secret law. When this sort of pure type failure occurs, a court must dismiss
a trade secret claim due to lack of independent economic value.276
Another example of a type failure occurs when the information itself is
inherently noneconomic in nature. For example, a few cases have tested
whether religious scriptures or yoga techniques derive economic value from
secrecy.277 Courts have erred on the side of protectability, but only so long
as the claimant clearly explains how their noneconomic subject matter is
being used to generate commercial value.278 These cases teach that the
asserted economic value can stem from the fact that the trade secret owner is
licensing otherwise noneconomic information to others as part of a business
model. For example, the Church of Scientology achieved different outcomes
in two cases in which it sought to protect secret “training materials and course
manuals of the Scientology religion.”279 In one case, the church lost because
it did not explain how it made a profit from keeping its materials secret.280
However, in the other case, the church successfully demonstrated that the
materials generated “substantial revenue” for the church “in the form of
licensing fees paid by Churches that are licensed to use the [materials],” as
well as “from donations by parishioners for services based upon the
[materials].”281
A final example of a type failure occurs when the plaintiff asserts trade
secrecy status for information that does not relate to what the company
actually does in its business. Examples of secrets that do not derive economic
value from secrecy might include the fact that a company is breaking the law,
or some other piece of embarrassing information that would be reputationally
harmful but is not illegal per se. A high-profile illustration is the attempt by
various tech firms, including Microsoft, to claim employee diversity data as
trade secrets.282 These firms tried to argue that they derive the same type of

276. This also fails to meet the DTSA’s jurisdictional interstate commerce requirement.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1) (stating that information must be “related to a product or service
used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce”). Congress’s power to protect
trade secrets under the Commerce Clause is broad, but activity that does not have any effect
on commerce would not be within Congress’s power to regulate. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3;
see also Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L.
REV. 317, 348–51 (2015) (discussing scope of federal trade secret law’s interstate commerce
requirement).
277. See generally Art of Living Found. v. Does 1–10, No. 10 Civ. 5022, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61582 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2012); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260 (E.D.
Va. 1995).
278. See Art of Living Found., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61582, at *64 (finding yoga manuals
and teacher training materials did not lack “independent economic value” because plaintiff
attested that they helped distinguish its courses from others and thus attract students).
279. See Lerma, 897 F. Supp. at 264; Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n
Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1253 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
280. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. at 266 (“[P]laintiff has not demonstrated that the AT documents
[containing religious philosophy and training materials] provide plaintiff with any economic
advantage over any competitors.”).
281. Netcom On-Line, 923 F. Supp. at 1253.
282. See Jamillah Bowman Williams, Why Companies Shouldn’t Be Allowed to Treat Their
Diversity Numbers as Trade Secrets, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 15, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/
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value from keeping their diversity data secret as they do from keeping their
technology and business strategies secret.283 But many speculate that the
firms’ real reason for seeking protection was that they did not wish for the
embarrassingly low diversity numbers to become public.284
The disclosure of this type of reputationally harmful information might
theoretically benefit the company’s competitors or others who could obtain
value “from the disclosure or use of the information.”285 But this sort of
information does not impart economic-type value under the statutes. In
Microsoft’s case, the company could try to argue that its diversity numbers
affect its economic performance, and therefore, that competitors or others
might benefit from imitating this strategy. But if Microsoft does not provide
such an explanation—or if, as happened in one case,286 the explanation is not
seen as plausible—then the information does not possess economic value as
a result of secrecy.
To be clear, “negative know-how” can be protectable as a trade secret. But
this term refers specifically to information regarding mistakes and wrong
turns in the course of researching a product or invention that is related to the
business and was costly to develop, and from which others could benefit in
their own business operations.287 It surely does not extend to any negative
information held within the company.
Protecting potentially embarrassing information that is not related to what
a company actually does is virtually impossible to justify under traditional
incentives theory.288 At the same time, as Charles Tait Graves and Sonia
Katyal recently observed, facilitating the “seclusion” of secrets that have
little to do with companies’ core business operations can come at a social
cost.289 For instance, what if the information is relevant to an employee’s
decision to take a job at the company?290 What if it is relevant to the public

02/why-companies-shouldnt-be-allowed-to-treat-their-diversity-numbers-as-trade-secrets
[https://perma.cc/YD8R-FTRC].
283. Id.
284. See id. (documenting several instances of “companies, particularly in tech,” seeking
to protect diversity data and initiatives as trade secrets); see also Jamillah Bowman Williams,
Diversity as a Trade Secret, 107 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1697–98 (2019) (discussing Moussouris v.
Microsoft Corp., No. 15-cv-1483, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34685, at *38 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 16,
2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 15-cv-1483, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34558
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 2018)).
285. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (emphasis added).
286. Moussouris, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34685, at *38 (observing that what Microsoft was
calling “competitive harm” due to disclosure of its raw diversity data was “essentially business
reputational harm”).
287. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 637–38 (2021); see
also Charles Tait Graves, The Law of Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 387, 391–92 (2007).
288. Cf. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974).
289. See Graves & Katyal, supra note 8, at 1380–90.
290. See Orly Lobel, Knowledge Pays: Reversing Information Flows and the Future of
Pay Equity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 588–96 (2020) (arguing that “pay secrecy” and legal
limits on workers’ ability to reveal their salary to coworkers or others in the industry
exacerbates unjustified wage gaps); see also Graves & Katyal, supra note 8, at 1385–86
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at large?291 A few courts applying the DTSA have reached conclusions
consistent with the notion that the mere risk of reputational harm does not
suffice to show economic value from secrecy.292 Courts should look out for
type failures in future cases.293
D. Timing Failures
The final value failure is the timing failure. This is where a trade secret is
sought to be protected during the incorrect time frame. The timing failure
occurs on both the front end (when it is too early) and the back end (when it
is too late). Each of these situations is discussed below.
1. No Potential Future Economic Value
Intellectual property law has a complicated relationship with undeveloped
ideas, and, for policy reasons, it has not traditionally protected mere
“products of the mind.”294 Modern trade secret law is explicitly designed to
be available for research, prototypes, strategies, and other information held
by start-ups and other entities in the precommercial phase.295 Nonetheless,
trade secret law is only triggered if the information has at least potential
independent economic value.296 This is a crucial limitation on protection for
mere ideas whose economic value remains purely hypothetical. When a trade
secret plaintiff seeks to protect secrets too early in the development timeline,
a “timing failure” occurs that should result in dismissal of the claim.
Courts have already recognized that timing failures arise in the context of
so-called “idea submission” cases. This is where the plaintiff asserts legal
rights to an idea and claims that they deserve compensation after someone
with whom they shared the idea in confidence uses it without permission.297
(discussing situations where an employer claims to own trade secrets consisting of the salaries
of its employees).
291. See Morten & Kapczynski, supra note 36, at 494–96 (critiquing secrecy of clinical
trial data).
292. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Russian Fed’n, 392 F. Supp. 3d 410, 440, 448 (S.D.N.Y.
2019); Ukrainian Future Credit Union v. Seikaly, No. 17-cv-11483, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
194165, at *23–26 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 27, 2017).
293. For example, Waymo recently alleged that safety information related to its driverless
cars, including descriptions of past crashes, constitutes trade secrets. See Russ Mitchell,
Waymo Sues State DMV to Keep Robotaxi Safety Details Secret, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2022,
5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2022-01-28/waymo-robot-taxi-suesstate-secret-black-ice [https://perma.cc/FRW5-KP2S]; see also infra notes 303–08 and
accompanying text.
294. See also Int’l News Serv. v. AP, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See generally Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protection for Products of the Mind: An “Idea”
Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703 (2006).
295. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 637–38 (2021);
see also Hrdy & Lemley, supra note 5, at 30–31.
296. See Robert Denicola, The New Law of Ideas, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 195, 200, 220
(2014).
297. These cases may implicate both implied-in-fact contract and trade secret claims. See
Charles Tait Graves, Should California’s Film Script Cases Be Merged into Trade Secret
Law?, 44 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 21, 23–24 (2020); Camilla Hrdy, Charles Tait Graves: Idea

2022]

THE VALUE IN SECRECY

603

Courts have held that idea submissions can potentially be protected as trade
secrets, even if they are not yet fully developed. For example, in Learning
Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc.,298 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit found that a prototype for a toy train track that made a
“clickety-clack” sound was protectable as a trade secret, even though the idea
was preliminary and did not work perfectly.299 However, courts have
recognized that, sometimes, it is just too early to claim legal rights. For
example, in a pre-DTSA case, Postal Presort, Inc. v. Stasieczko,300 a Kansas
state court held that the plaintiff’s early-stage business concept for a direct
mail marketing service failed to meet the independent economic value
requirement, explaining that the possibility that the concept might come to
fruition in the future was not sufficient.301 The court suggested that “[e]ven
meeting with potential investors or design engineers to discuss the concept”
might not have been enough.302
Outside of idea-submission cases, there are broader implications for
early-stage technologies and nascent industries. If the alleged trade secret
relates to a new industry in which commercialization is a remote prospect, it
is possible to argue that the secret lacks even “potential” economic value.
This issue arose recently in Wisk Aero LLC v. Archer Aviation, Inc.,303 a trade
secret dispute between two air taxi service start-ups. The plaintiff Wisk
claimed that Archer misappropriated Wisk’s trade secrets relating to its
air-taxi service through former Wisk employees.304 Wisk claimed that it
“created the world’s first all-electric, self-flying, vertical takeoff and landing
air taxi,” that it invested at least one billion dollars to develop five prototypes,
and that it had already taken over 1,500 flights.305 But the company was not
yet selling air-taxi seats to the general public, and the rapidly evolving
industry’s future is uncertain. Archer seized on this weakness, alleging that
Wisk failed in its pleadings to address “whether any one of its alleged trade
secrets derives economic value by virtue of being secret.”306 The judge
Submission Cases, Desny Claims, and Trade Secret Law, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Mar. 10,
2021, 2:44 PM), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2021/03/charles-tait-graves-ideasubmission.html [https://perma.cc/N765-ANM3].
298. 342 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2003).
299. See id. at 718, 725–27.
300. No. 110,489, 2015 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 91 (Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2015).
301. Id. at *6–7.
302. Id.
303. No. 21-cv-02450, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160001 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2021).
304. Complaint at 3–4, Wisk Aero LLC v. Archer Aviation, Inc., No. 21-cv-02450, 2021
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160001 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2021).
305. WISK, https://wisk.aero/ [https://perma.cc/FBU4-UM72] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022);
see also Scott Graham, Wisk Aero’s Flying Taxi Suit Isn’t Yet Ready for Takeoff, Judge Hints,
LAW.COM (July 21, 2021, 11:11 PM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2021/07/21/wiskaeros-flying-taxi-suit-isnt-yet-ready-for-takeoff-judge-hints/?slreturn=20210625121633
[https://perma.cc/6FTQ-JFDA]; Tim Hornyak, The Flying Taxi Market May Be Ready for
Takeoff, Changing the Travel Experience Forever, CNBC (Mar. 7, 2021, 10:30 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/06/the-flying-taxi-market-is-ready-to-change-worldwidetravel.html [https://perma.cc/DNH6-HSZB].
306. Motion to Strike at 1, 6, 10, 26, Wisk Aero LLC v. Archer Aviation, Inc.,
No. 21-cv-02450, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160001 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2021).
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appeared to share Archer’s skepticism, denying Wisk’s motion for a
preliminary injunction307 because Wisk had “failed to show that the putative
secrets derive economic value from their secrecy.”308
When independent economic value is triggered in these early-stage
situations, it sets a de facto start date for the legal right, preventing trade
secrets from accruing too early before there is anything of sufficient value to
protect. Independent economic value denies intellectual property rights to
putative trade secret owners whose ideas are too far from realization to
deserve protection. There are several analogous doctrines in other areas of
intellectual property law.309 Courts should not ignore what this requirement
does for trade secret law. When courts find that the information at issue looks
too much like a mere idea, they should hold that it lacks independent
economic value.310
2. End of Economic Value
The independent economic value requirement also operates on the back
end by ensuring that trade secrets cannot be protected too late in the
information’s commercial life cycle. Trade secret protection, unlike patent
or copyright protection, does not have a fixed statutory term limit.311 Many
commentators state offhandedly that trade secrets can last forever so long as
they remain secret.312 But this is not accurate. Many trade secrets are
commercially relevant for only a short window of time and may someday
lose their economic value from secrecy. When this occurs, the trade secret
expires as if it had become public. This is yet another species of “timing
failure.”
307. Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Wisk Aero LLC v. Archer
Aviation, Inc., No. 21-cv-02450, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160001 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2021).
308. Tentative Ruling and Hearing Procedure at 1, Wisk Aero LLC v. Archer Aviation,
Inc., No. 21-cv-02450, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160001 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2021).
309. One is trademark law’s “use in commerce” requirement. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining
use in commerce); see also, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97
(1918). In fact, funnily enough, a well-known trademark case invalidated a trademark for the
name AIRFLITE, which was supposed to be the name for an air taxi service, but the service
“never got off the ground.” See Aycock Eng’g, Inc. v. Airflite, Inc. 560 F.3d 1350, 1353–54
(Fed. Cir. 2009); cf. Hrdy & Lemley, supra note 5, at 15–24 (comparing trade secret’s common
law use requirement to trademark’s). A less obvious analogy can be drawn to patent utility,
which is sometimes conceptualized as a “timing device” that ensures that patentees do not
seek rights too early in the development timeline, before the invention has a presently availing
or plausibly achievable use. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and Economics
Agenda for the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2087 (2000); Julian David Forman,
A Timing Perspective on the Utility Requirement in Biotechnology Patent Applications,
12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 647, 648–49, 661–62 (2002).
310. Accord Denicola, supra note 296, at 220.
311. Hrdy & Lemley, supra note 5, at 12–13; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 39 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1995) (noting that there is no fixed duration for a trade
secret protection).
312. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1777
(2016) (“Trade secrecy . . . lasts as long as the information is kept secret.”); Natalie Ram,
Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 659, 666 (2018) (“So long as the information
at issue remains secret, the legal protections of trade secret law will attach indefinitely.”).
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Once again, analogies can be drawn to several other intellectual property
doctrines—in particular, to trademark law’s doctrine of abandonment due to
cessation of use.313 In trade secret law, independent economic value supplies
a similarly “functional” way to set the expiration date of the trade secret.
Like in trademark law, there is no fixed statutory term. But if a secret no
longer possesses independent economic value at the time of the alleged act
of misappropriation, then it is no longer an enforceable trade secret. Many
courts and commentators have recognized this principle.314 Unfortunately,
though, some courts continue to get the time frame wrong, assuming that the
trade secret must still have value when the claim is brought.315 For example,
in Sirius Computer Solutions, Inc. v. Sachs,316 a court found that independent
economic value was not established because the plaintiff brought its DTSA
claim “approximately ten months after” the alleged act of misappropriation,
by which time, the court determined, the information had “become stale and
any competitive advantage it may have conferred, no longer exist[ed].”317
But under the modern statutes, the requisite independent economic value has
to exist at the time of the misappropriation.318 The DTSA and the UTSA
embed this time frame into the definition of “misappropriation,” clarifying
that the trade secret needs to exist at the time of the alleged disclosure or
use.319

313. For example, in trademark law, when a trademark ceases to be used in commerce, it
is deemed abandoned. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining abandonment). Independent
economic value can be seen as codifying an abandonment principle akin to trademark law’s.
Hrdy & Lemley, supra note 5, at 17–18.
314. Hrdy & Lemley, supra note 5, at 43–44, 44 n.205 (citing cases); see also HALLIGAN
& WEYAND, supra note 55, at 136–37 (noting that trade secrets can become “obsolete” not
only when they lose their secrecy, but also when they become “stale or devoid of economic
value,” and giving the example of a methodology for complying with certain regulations or
technical standards that are superseded).
315. At least one common law decision used this time frame, assuming that a business that
had stopped using the trade secret by the time of litigation could not obtain an injunction. See
Victor Chem. Works v. Iliff, 132 N.E. 806 (Ill. 1921) (discussed in Hrdy & Lemley, supra
note 5, at 20–21 nn.91–92).
316. No. 20-cv-1432, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77595 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2021).
317. Id. at *10–11; see also Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. Cal. Custom Shapes, Inc., 116 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 358, 368–69 (Ct. App. 2002) (observing that any value that the secrets once had ended
by the time of litigation).
318. A defendant can still make a better argument against granting an injunction if the value
of the trade secret has dissipated by the time of judgment. Camilla Hrdy, Elizabeth Rowe:
Does eBay Apply to Trade Secret Injunctions?, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Nov. 10, 2019,
9:03 PM), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2019/11/elizabeth-rowe-does-ebay-applyto-trade.html [https://perma.cc/PD8H-DZEG]; Camilla Hrdy, Deepa Varadarajan on Trade
Secret Injunctions and Trade Secret “Trolls,” WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Feb. 22, 2020,
12:38 PM), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2020/02/deepa-varadarajan-on-tradesecret.html [https://perma.cc/LQL7-MYVA].
319. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985), 14
U.L.A. 636–37 (2021); see also Hrdy & Lemley, supra note 5, at 29. The new Massachusetts
statute, arguably superior on this point, embeds this time frame into the definition of a “trade
secret,” stating, in relevant part, that a trade secret constitutes information that, “at the time of
the alleged misappropriation,” provides “economic advantage, actual or potential, from not
being generally known.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 42(4)(i) (2020).
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The upshot is that, if independent economic value has lapsed by the date
of the alleged misappropriation—for instance, due to a change in the
marketplace or a game-changing advancement in the state of the art—then
the misappropriation is no longer actionable.320 Courts have held as much
under the UTSA.321 At least one court has dismissed for lack of independent
economic value under the DTSA in part because the court found that the
information had become outdated.322 As the newly federalized framework
evolves, courts should continue to use timing failure analyses more often to
weed out cases based on expired secrets.
CONCLUSION
Independent economic value is a crucial element of trade secrecy that has
been remarkably underexplored. At first blush, independent economic value
may seem redundant. Surely no one would bother to protect, let alone
litigate, a trade secret that lacks independent economic value. But well-kept
secrets that lack economic value can, and do, end up in court as the subject
of trade secret litigation. The standard circumstantial evidence that courts
use to show independent economic value, including reasonable secrecy
precautions and “sweat work,” do not prove very much in the end. This is
troublesome because independent economic value is the only tool that courts
have for directly assessing the value of information being claimed as a trade
secret. When courts fail to use this tool, a variety of negative consequences
can result, including wasted court resources,323 threats to competition and
innovation, needless impingement on employee autonomy and mobility,324
and worrisome restrictions on speech and disclosure of information of public
importance.325
This Article has revealed that several kinds of “value failures”—amount
failures, causation failures, type failures, and timing failures—can and do
arise in trade secret litigation, probably far more often than we know. If
courts continue to ignore independent economic value or assume that it can
be proven from other factors in the case, negative policy consequences will
320. The plaintiff can still have a cause of action if the value dissipates after the date of
misappropriation—for instance, perhaps the defendant’s own actions caused the disclosure.
Remedies include damages or a “head start” injunction to eliminate any ill-gotten “commercial
advantage.” UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 749 (2021); see also
18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3) (listing remedies available).
321. See, e.g., Fox Sports Net N., LLC. v. Minn. Twins P’ship, 319 F.3d 329, 335–36
(8th Cir. 2003) (holding outdated financial information no longer protectable because
“obsolete information cannot form the basis for a trade secret claim because the information
has no economic value”).
322. 24 Seven, LLC v. Martinez, No. 19-CV-7320, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15480, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2021).
323. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir.
1991).
324. Lemley, supra note 4, at 343; Graves & Katyal, supra note 8, at 1338, 1407–08;
LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE, supra note 35, at 1–11; Hrdy & Lemley, supra note 5, at
14–15.
325. Levine, supra note 36, at 431–32; Graves & Katyal, supra note 8, at 1337; Williams,
supra note 284, at 1698.
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continue to result. Information that does not derive economic value from
secrecy is not a trade secret. To realize the full benefit of this underused
statutory element, courts should assess it more comprehensively and
consistently, as they do with secrecy and reasonable secrecy precautions.
Taking independent economic value more seriously is a first step toward
taking trade secrets more seriously.

